The stories of the past oracles (711ff and 774ff) as told by Iokaste and Oidipus have a common feature in "structure" that the fear of an oracle makes the person (s) concerned attempt to escape its fulfilment, only to bring about the events foretold by it Now an analysis of the play reveals that there is a similar pattern in the actions A The fear of Teiresias' prophecy of the banishment as Laios' murderer which Oidipus suspects to be part of a conspiracy makes him attempt to escape its fulfilment by condemning the supposed conspirator Kreon to death, only to learn, after the release of the latter, the details of Laios' death from Iokaste who, wishing to free him from his fear, does the opposite B The renewed fear (cf 747) of Teiresias' prophecy makes him attempt to escape its fulfilment by summoning as a sole hope Laios' former herdsman who reported the king's murder by "robbers" C The fear of the oracle (incest) makes him attempt to escape its fulfilment by refusing to return to Corinth, only to learn from the Corinthian that he, when infant, was about to be exposed by Laios' herdsman It is only natural, seeing he has just now confessed his intense fear of the oracle (incest) in 973ff, that the fear of the oracle (patricide and incest) is renewed when he knows that he was an unwanted child probably of Theban origin D The renewed fear of the past oracle makes him attempt to escape its fulfilment by interrogating the herdsman about his parents (and by avoiding meeting them), only to find the dire truth There is apparently a break between A B and C D The Corinthian's arrival itself is an unexpected surprise not only for Oidipus and Iokaste but also for the spectators, for it occurs not as a consequence of the previous actions but as if Apollon responded to Iokaste's prayer (919ff) The unity of plot, however, is kept by Oidipus' attempts to escape fulfilment of prophecy and oracle Teiresias' prophecy is essentially the same in content as the past oracle, the difference being that the former foretells the results of the latter It is in C that Aristotle (Po 1452a 22ff) sees the play's peripeteia This peripeteia is brought about "in accordance with probability or necessity", that is, "because of, not after" (1452a 21) Oidipus' attempts to escape fulfilment of prophecy and oracle Oidipus seeks the truth about Laios' murder and his parentage, but he does not seek it for itself but in order to escape fulfilment of Teiresias' prophecy and of the past oracle What finally causes his ruin is not his quest for the truth but his attempts to escape fulfilment of prophecy and oracle, as in the case of his father (711ff) But to attempt to escape fulfilment of prophecy and oracle is, in other words, to struggle against one's own fate Through knowledge of this fact Oidipus comes to recognize and accept the fate as his own

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The agon scene of Euripides' Troades is difficult to relate to the main course of the dramatic action Apart from its bafflmgly sophistic tone, there are seemingly odd points in it (1) Hecuba requests Menelaus to give her enemy Helen an opportunity for apology (2) Menelaus allows Hecuba's request and takes sides with her (3) Menelaus allows the debate whose outcome is already determined These points have encouraged some critics to see the scene as an interlude with purely intellectual appeal not relevant to the theme of the play By re-examining these three points and the contents of the debate, this paper attempts to clarify the significance of the Helen scene and relate it to the overall structure of the play Close reading of 11 873-75 shows Menelaus' reluctance to kill his wife Helen, in spite of his apparent contempt toward her He is anxious to play the role of an executioner in order to refute the charge of uxonousness nurled at him by the Greeks, because he is surrounded by the very soldiers (οπαονεζ, 880) who hurled that charge at him and now hope Helen's death The whole agon is a play within a play performed before the audience on the stage, common soldiers as mute actors Observing that Menelaus is on the verge of surrender to Helen's charm, Hecuba tries to take vengeance upon her, taking over the will of Cassandra and Andromache Hecuba's request for debate is not a convenient clue to introduce an intellectual entertainment, but a desperate attempt to secure the execution of Helen Hecuba counts on the presence of Greek soldiers as witnesses of Menelaus' decision, and he is forced to allow the debate under the pressure of their mute presence as she expected The whole debate scene can be seen as a reproduction of the Judgement of Paris by Hecuba she appeals to the virtue of goddesses Hera and Athena, and in doing so, she recalls the discussion by Cassandra (=the virgin goddess Athena) and Andromache (=the chaste wife goddess Hera) in order to refute Helen (=Aphrodite) Hecuba nearly wins with her power of logos, but at that moment Helen embraces Menelaus' neck and knee for supplication This physical contact, the power of Eros, persuades Menelaus (=Paris) Hecuba's last hope, vengeance, is lost

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We have two Thasian inscriptions in which the regulations of wine-trade are engraved One inscription (a) is SEG XXXVI, Nr 790, dated back to 480-60 B C The other (b) is IG XII, Suppl Nr 347, dated to the last quarter of the 5th century B C The inscription (a) records only the latter half of a law, while (b) has two laws [(bI) and (bII)] which are essentially different from each other in text form So we have three laws about the wine-trade in Thasos On penal regulations and prosecution proceedings, there are many things in common between the law of inscription (a) and the law (bI) The law (bI) is a regulation of the purchase of wine, so must be the law of inscription (a) The law (bII) is composed of three clauses in one of which the main contents are lost The first clause holds only prosecution proceedings, the second prevents Thasian ships from bringing foreign wine in Thasian territory, and the third prohibits the sale of wine by false containers The second and third clauses refer to a law which forbids the dilution of wine with water Therefore this is the law against something dishonest like pouring water into wine, perhaps pouring foreign wine into Thasian wine That is to say, (bII) could regulate the sale of wine Why are two laws of different character written together on the same stone ? The reason is that regulations of the inscription (b) focus on the wine dealer, who buys and sells Thasian wine On the basis of (bII) in which we find not only government officials in charge of continental territory, but also an import restriction on foreign wine, most scholars have insisted that Thasos practised "protectionism" and that the policy was carried out under the Thasian oligarchy after the revolt against Athenian imperialism around the end of the 5th century B C The clause (2) in (bII), however, does not put an embargo on all wine imports Consequently, we should not immediately assign it to a specified political position of the city-state The legal improvement of the period including (bII) should be studied in the context of the development of Thasian wine production and trade The law of the inscription (a) and the chronology of "protostamp amphorae" prove that by the end of the archaic age Thasos produced and exported wine But Thasian wine was confused with βiβλινοζοiνοζ", which was the good wine from Thrace opposite Thasos island The confusion seems to have reflected that the Thasian authorities could not easily control over the wine produced on her continental territory The high reputation and popularity of Thasian wine was probably established around the last quarter of the 5th century B C It is at the period that Thasos improved her legal system to the wine-trade to cope with its development In the works of Athenian old comedy of the same period and the "hermocopidai" inscription (414/3 B C), we find the great Athenian interest in Thasian wine It is possible, therefore, that the Thasian legal improvement was influenced by the Athenian interest It is important, however, that in spite of Athenian influence Thasos developed state control over the winetrade in the direction which she had taken from the period of the inscription (a) State control over the wine-trade was the fundamental policy with which she had to make herself free from the existing financial structure that depended heavily on mine resources It was to be Thasian principal policy under any type of government or any political position of the city-state

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Obligations towards personal kins and friends frequently conflict with obligations to the broader society Such a dilemma between private and public in Athenian democracy is here explored The case of Andocides, who decided to inform against his friends on their anti-social mutilation of the hermai in 415 B C, provides a rare opportunity to compare reports of different contemporary attitudes The real facts of the case are not here considered, rather the reaction of public opinion (1) It is legitimate to deal with the hermai affair independently of the profanations of the Mysteries While the affair of the Mysteries was a social phenomenon, repeated and secretly prevailed on wider range of Athenian society, there is a good reason to regard the mutilation as the intention of a single hetaireia (2) Andocides maintains that the mutilation was to confirm the pistis (fidelity) of his hetaireia He dares to explain their offense to have been just for friendship of their hetaireia (3) After the offense, his fellow members of the hetaireia demanded his silence for the sake of friendship On his account, it was not until he was jailed with his father and other kinsmen on suspicion of the offense, and entreated by his cousin Charmides to tell the whole truth to save them, that he thought of informing against the hetaireia members Here contemporary sources show problematic discrepancies in the recognition of his betrayal (4) According to Thucydides, the main object of the persuasion was that Andocides should save himself and the polis at the same time On the other hand, Andocides explains in On the Mysteries that the main point of Charmides' entreaty was that Andocides should decide between kinsmen and fellow hetairoi, he apologizes for his decision to save many innocent kinsmen by informing against only four friends He argues, contrary to Thycydides, that his own benefit was out of consideration, even the interest of the polis seems to be a secondary matter, coming into consideration only after he had decided to inform The same process of decision-making is preferred also in On his return (5) However, in Against Andocides, Andocides is accused of betraying both kinsmen and friends in order to save himself The point at issue is whether his behavior can be condemned in view of private friendship, not its legitimacy in view of public benefit It is concluded that, at least in the world of forensic speeches, Andocides was neither expected to betray his fellow hetairoi for the benefit of the polis, nor justified in doing so Similar views are found to be expressed in other forensic speeches In classical Athens, the public sphere did not hold superiority over the private one, rather, the opposite

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The fragments of Book III of the early dialogue De Philosophia show Aristotle pursuing his studies on Deity and the Universe Above all, fr 16, preserved in Simplicius' Commentary in De Caelo 288 28-289 15, is characterized by its reference to the philosophical proof of the existence of Deity as well as that of the immutability of Deity As J Bernays pointed out, the latter proof presupposes the former Here, the obvious but unspoken premise of the former proof is clarified, and it is explained in what sense the latter proof presupposes the former The discussion of the existence of Deity appears in the first part of the fragment "In general, where there is a better there is also a best Since, then, among existing things one is better than another, there is also something that is best, which will be the divine" Most commentators (e g, W Jaeger, P Wilpert, and C J De Vogel) have ignored the (obvious to Aristotle, therefore not mentioned) premise of this proof of the existence of Deity as something that is best Behind this proof lies the premise that a series of better things is not endless of this Aristotle seems quite convinced Taking this premise into consideration, we can properly appreciate the validity of the proof of the existence of Deity without the help of the scholastic argumentum ex gradibus, the theory of forms and the realistic scale of entities With regard to the proof of the immutability of Deity, the following choices are enumerated and ruled out one by one The choices are as follows, "Now that which changes is changed either by something else or by itself, and if by something else, either by something better or by something worse, and if by itself, either to something worse or through desire for something nobler" These choices are ruled out on the grounds of the existence of Deity as something that is best, as was argued in the first part of the fragment The transition of time which change in general presupposes is half hidden in this proof this presupposition is once taken into account, then left out by means of the nature of "best" that Deity bears This is the point of this proof which most commentators have not been aware of So far as Fr 16 is concerned, the immutability of Deity can be understood in the same way as in the Corpus This conclusion raises the questions, "Did Aristotle in the early dialogues have the same opinion on the immutability of Deity as he did in the Corpus ?" and "Is fr 16 a genuine fragment of De Philosophia ?" But we should bear in mind that the fragmentary nature of the dialogue does not permit much speculation on what Aristotle thought Deity to be

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In Sextus' argument against moral values, especially in Outlines of Pyrrhonism III (PH3) and Against the Ethicists (M11), we are shown statements which appear to subscribe to relativism (SR), e g "Nothing is by nature (φνσει) good" The purpose of this paper is to consider whether these SR are coherent with the sceptical attitude manifested in PH1, that is εποχη (suspension of judgment) Over the last few decades, this problem has been the subject of controversy One reaction has been to accuse Sextus of incoherence Annas & Barnes have held that Sextus conflates relativism with scepticism Annas concludes that Sextus is a phihstine about ethics The other reaction has been to try to defend Sextus McPherran regards SR as the reports of subjective affections, which involve no commitment to the truth of the external objects, and locates SR in the sceptical strategy In both cases, however, it is agreed that SR in themselves are alien substances to scepticism In recent studies, Bett proposes a new interpretation He regards SR as the conclusion, which Sceptic himself adopts He pays attention to the relation of SR with Sceptic's happiness For Sextus says in M11 that SR lead to αταραξια (tranquillity) In addition, Bett emphasizes the difference between M11 and PH3 Considering the chronology of Sextus' works, he presumes that SR (in M11) are relics of a phase in the history of Pyrrhonism far earlier than Sextus himself, whose attitude is suspension of judgment (in PH1-3) I agree with Bett in thinking that SR are Sceptic's conclusion However, I do not share his chronological solution, because similarly in M11 and PH3, both SR and εποχη play important roles in relation to the sceptical aim The question arises again Are SR coherent with the suspension of judgment? I want to throw new light on the concept of μετριοπαθεια (moderate affection) which is another aim of scepticism Sextus says "The aim of Sceptic is tranquillity in regard to belief and moderate affection in regard to things unavoidable" (PH1 30) Moreover, it is noteworthy that this concept can be found only in arguments against moral values, and that Sextus explicitly declares SR only in that case It will be clear from these facts that Sextus has been aware of a property of moral values However, I do not mean that Sextus affirms this distinction For Sceptic is, as Sextus says, the person who suspends judgment about everything (M11 150) I therefore conclude that SR remain as a result of suspension of judgement in regard to things unavoidable Concerning moral values, after we suspend judgment about their nature, we can not detach ourselves from them perfectly This is because we are placed unavoidably and accidentally into definite circumstances, that have definite moral values SR mean this To accept SR is not the defeat of scepticism For only Sceptic can be in a state of moderate affection without having additional belief this is good/bad by nature It is not too far from the truth to say that SR belong to a different category from two categories, what is the case by nature and what appears

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According to the traditional version of the legend concerning the Gallic occupation of Rome in 390 B C, M Manlius, awakened by the cackling of geese, miraculously saved the Capitol from the night attack by the Gauls who, having occupied the rest of the city, now intended to capture also the citadel Since 1953 Otto Skutsch, an authority on Ennian studies, has persistently asserted on the basis of the fragment Ann 227-8 Sk (=164-5 V^2) that Ennius, in defiance of the tradition, talked rather of the fall of the Capitol The present article counters his theory on three points and aims to establish the probability that Ennius adhered to the traditional version Firstly, the fragment does not provide sufficient evidence for asserting that Ennius spoke of the fall The verb cruentant does not in itself indicate that the vigiles are massacred, still less that the Capitol was taken Skutsch denies the imperfective character of cruentant used with repente As various instances show, however, this adverb does not necessarily preclude an inchoative connotation of the verb with which it is used It is therefore possible that the fragment talks merely of relatively light wounds sustained by the vigiles In one of the preceding books of the Annals (probably the fourth), Ennius dwelt on the more positive aspect of the story for the Romans (Manlius' prowess), in the seventh, to which this fragment belongs, he underlines in retrospect the negative aspect (the wounding of the vigiles) to make vivid the panic of the Romans in face of a renewed Gallic incursion (225 B C) This device is used also by Polybius (2 23 7) and Silius (6 5546) Secondly, there is no good reason to doubt Propertius' testimony concerning the contents of the Annals (3 3 1-14) nor to read cecini instead of cecinit (line 7) As Butler and Barber have pointed out, the phrase regiaque Aemilia vecta tropaea rate (8) refers to the triumph of Aemilius Regillus (191 B C), not to that of Aemilius Paullus (168 B C), so it is unnecessary to suppose that the catalogue (7-12) includes episodes which Ennius does not relate Furthermore, as Kambylis observes, the reading cecinit is more suitable for the context Therefore, the phrase anseris et tutum voce fuisse Iovem (12) clearly means Ennius' reference to a successful defence of the Capitol Thirdly, in the light of the patriotic significance attached to the Capitol in the Republican age, it is implausible that Ennius should have related its fall in the Annals The Capitol had become the symbol of Rome's everlasting glory at latest by the third century B C And a passage in Cicero Pro Archia 22 confirms the public function of the Annals Lucan (5 27) and Tertullian (Apol 40) certainly hint at the fall, but it is wrong to suppose that Ennius could have been as free from the patriotic ideas as these writers of a later period when the Capitol had already lost its symbolic meaning in consequence of Rome's moral decadence These three points makes it more probable that Ennius spoke of the successful defence of the Capitol The episode would have fitted in with the patriotic flavour of the historical epic and must have been one of the highlights of the Annals

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Catullus 44 has many obscurities, among which the most important is the textual problem in the last line 21 since it affects the meaning of the curse in 18-20 and of the poem as a whole In this paper I try to defend the MS reading legit and thus to establish the unity of the poem as a literary critique against a frigid speech Lachmann's legi, followed by most scholars, involves serious difficulties First, the dramatic background of the poem cannot be explained without distortion Secondly, the last line does not fit in well with the context and the joke lacks in point The MS reading legit, which must mean private reading like legi in 12, is confirmed by its immediate context, that is (1) the implication of 21 Consider the purpose of Sestius' invitation As can be inferred from 10-2 and 18-9, he has a secret desire to be praised by his guests But he invites just after (tunc cum) he has read a bad book, which implies his insensibility to the defect of his work Here Catullus attacks his blindness and selfconceit (2) the expression of the curse gravedinem ferat fngus in 19-20 Since the frigus here means the frigidity of speech, the aim of the curse is Sestius' old because of a bad speech just as in 12-3 If Sestius read his 'bad book' himself, he is also expected to catch cold Line 21 shows that the curse may come true and explains why it takes such a form (3) the context of 18-21 In 18-9 Catullus pretends to make a vow that if he should take up Sestius' writings again he would submit to another cold, but in 20 he turns the curse from himself to Sestius (αποπομπη) with a παρα προσδοκιαν With this device he keeps his vow never to repeat the same error of reading Sestius' work, and in 21 makes the curse all the more effective because here he tells that it is Sestius himself who read the bad book and so deserves cold Thus legit suits the context perfectly, bringing a clever joke to a finish The nature of frigus further confirms it In Greek rhetorical theory ψυχρον denotes bad taste showing itself in excessive style, and the frigus of Sestius' speech is implied as such by the food metaphor in 7-13 And the concept of ψυχρον coincides with that of κακοζηλον (Volkmann 406, Lausberg § 1077), about which see Quintilian, Inst 8 3 56 The defect of κακοζηλον-ψυχρον consists in the author's excessive pursuit of virtus, but the author, lacking indicium, is unaware of the defect but rather flatters himself on the work, while the audience or readers feel cold at this as bad taste The author's blindness and self-conceit, noted in (1) above, has the same root as frigus The last part of Catullus 44 shows such a situation Sestius had a chance to realize the frigus because he read his own book, but he is still blind to it and invites the poet, who answers with a curse Also in c 84 a frigid speaker Arrius is criticized, because 10 horribilis and 12 Hionios suggest his frigidity In vv 3-4 Catullus points to his self-conceit and κακοζηλον (n b the similarity to 44 21), which leads to frigus Catullus, a doctus poeta, was certainly well acquainted with such niceties of rhetorical theory What is the meaning of the whole poem? Stylistically it is a travesty of the frigid style, and m content this mock-hymn is a playful device to make literary criticism in metaphorical terms The first part of the poem implies the urbanitas of the villa as opposed to the rushcitas of Sestius' speech (n b his similarity to Suffenus in c 22, e g 22 9 legos=44 12 legi, 22 17 [+ 16 cum]=44 21) And the'god'of the farm who cures the literary cold and who has authority to punish the poet's peccatum (17) of gluttony, which is a metaphor for anti-Calhmachean taste, may be identified with Callimachean Apollo (cf fr 1 22-4, 32-5) So far the 'hymn' to this god is an oblique way to criticize Sestius' speech and to suggest the literary principles of the

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Statius' Thebais follows the example of the "divine Aeneis" (Theb 12 816) But it is more than imitation Thebais has its own peculiar tone. The purpose of this paper is to elucidate the originality of the Thebais by comparison with its model First, Laius' appearance in Eteocles' dream (Theb 2 89-133) is compared with the episode of Allecto-Turnus (Aen 7 413-472) The three main characteristics of the Thebais can be summarized as follows 1) Fierce hatred within a family Statius lays stress on this deep-rooted human emotion Although in Aen Allecto shows hatred, she does so on account of imprudent words against her infernal dignity, in other words, it is a mere accident On the other hand, Laius' hatred of his grandson has continued from the very moment of the patricide and will never perish Moreover, the family relationship makes his hatred fiercer Such gloomy emotion of Laius shows a lack of pietas, which was essential to the families in Aeneis 2) Desire for autocracy Turnus' defiance of Aeneas depends (partly) on his patriotic motivation On the other hand, Eteocles desires to keep his autocratic power only He does not defend fatherland or citizens He has no sense of responsibility to his status His people do not put reliance on him either but hate this tyrant Here again we can see a lack of pietas 3) Fear as a motive of an assault Eteocles is stimulated to the war by his fearfulness Both Turnus and Eteocles are seized by an awful fear, but the fear of Eteocles is different from Turnus' It was an infernal appearance of Allecto that horrified Turnus, whose feeling gradually changes into madness and anger Fear can not be said to be an immediate cause for the war Eteocles, on the other hand, is terrified by the news of his brother's betrothal which must be a great menace to his throne Then he immediately launches an attack Thus, his fear is a motive to promote the battle, rather than to prevent it Such a function of fear has not been seen in previous works These three characteristics are confirmed also by further comparisons, for example, the Katabasis of Amphiaraus (Theb 8 1-126) with the scene of Charon (Aen 6 384-410) The third (fear as a motive of an assault) frequently occurs in Thebais (for example 5 347-358, 12 682-697) Thus, although Statius seemingly follows Vergihus, he fills his epic with impious emotions, which give it unique characteristics

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