ロジャー・ベイコンの自然学観の由来 トマス・アクイナスとの比較におけるロジャー・ベイコンの自然学構想の基盤(Ⅲ)

抄録

The basic problems of this paper are as follows. Why did Roger Bacon attach importance to mathematics in relation with natural sciences and didn't Thomas Aquinas do so? Why did Bacon advocate the original idea of Scientia Experimentalis and didn't Thomas do so? Bacon's praise of mathematics is due to his presupposition of multiplicatio specierum about general actions in the natural world. Because Thomas didn't have such presupposition and moreover made a rigid distinction between mathematics and natural sciences, that is sciences of natura, Thomas didn't attach importance to mathematics for natural sciences. On the other hand, because of this rigid distinction, Thomas' view to mathematics presents even certain modernity where mathematics is regarded as a free hypothetico-deductiva system according to imagination. Bacon couldn't regard mathematics as a hypothetical system, because mathematics of him was linking with structures of existence. Bacon's idea of Scientia Experimentalis containing the idea of "verification" was possible only upon Bacon's more mediaeval conception of "experience", and the idea of "verification" like Bacon was impossible upon Thomas' more modern conception of "experience". Verification of Bacon is certificatio of conclusion by experience, and it means real proof by noble experience which directly proves truth, and doesn't mean test as procedure. Such idea of verification wasn't able to occur to Thomas upon Thomas' conception of experience as sources of science. Therfore also here the situation is paradoxical, and Bacon's idea of verification doesn't have but superficial modernity. Finally criticism on Crombie's view is added.