Abstract
The purpose of this study was to examine whether the just world interpretation of a derogation phenomenon in the Lerner-Simmons paradigm is valid.
107male and female undergraduates listened to a tape ostensibly recording the scene of a paired associate learning experiment with an imagine-self set (ISset) or watch-him set (WHset). Next, they evaluated the personal value of the learner (SP) under C (no shock), ES (error shock correspondence), or RS (random shock) conditions.
The results of 48 male subjects showed relatively clear tendencies as follows.
(1) ISset observers produced high relative impression value (RIV) for SP in all conditions. High RIV was connected with the perception of SP's performance in both C and ES conditions, and also with a positive attitude toward the learning experiment in the ES condition. In the RS condition, however, high RIV was connected with a negative attitude toward the learning experiment. Therefore, high RIV in the ES condition was thought to be a result of positive acceptance of the learning experiment, while in the RS condition it was thought to be a reflection of the sympathy for SP involved in an unjust experiment. However, in the RS condition, opposing Lerner's assertion, a belief in a just world operated to inhibit sympathy.
(2) WHset observers produced slightly high RIV in the ES condition, but relatively low RIV in the RS condition. In the latter condition relatively low RIV was connected with a positive attitude toward the learning experiment. It was thus inferred that extreme derogation of SP didn't occur because it was possible to restore justice by distortedly viewing the unjust learning experiment as just. In addition, in ES and RS conditions, the observer with a firmer belief in a just world tended to derogate SP more extremely.
