リスク学研究
Online ISSN : 2435-8436
Print ISSN : 2435-8428

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NIMBY問題で当事者に対する優位的正当化が抑制されるとき―地層処分場を焦点とした「誰がなぜゲーム」における将来世代の呈示―
野波 寬大友 章司坂本 剛田代 豊青木 俊明
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ジャーナル オープンアクセス 早期公開

論文ID: SRA-0331

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Legitimacy is defined as the approvability of an individual’s or others’ rights in the context of public decision-making. First, we discuss the theoretical background for people’s tendency to approve the concerned parties’ superior legitimacy (superior legitimization of the concerned party) in a “not in my backyard” (NIMBY) problem. This can be an irrational judgement because the enhancement of the public good that NIMBY facilities can achieve may be undermined by the rejection of the concerned party (e.g., local residents). Public decision making about NIMBY facilities may involve multi-polarization, in which there are two or more concerned parties who hold conflicting interests. Such a context will inhibit the superiority of legitimacy of a certain concerned party and increase the legitimacy of a government agency to balance the interests of the parties. In an experiment, participants played a simulation game (Who & Why Game) in which they were assigned to one of the four roles around the placement of a high-level radioactive waste storage facility: a local resident, an expert commission member, a national majority, or a government agency. They were then asked to discuss the problem. In a condition demonstrating the interests of future generations conflicting with those of local residents, superior legitimization of the concerned party (local residents) appeared to be inhibited, whereas legitimization of them was observed in a condition without the demonstration of future generations’ interests.

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