抄録
We often think of consciousness as if it were a capsule surrounded by a boundary. In this paper, I will show in a phenomenological way that such an image of consciousness does not match the reality given to us. In fact, we cannot find any borderline of our own consciousness. This peculiarity of consciousness makes it difficult to understand how we can experience the otherness of the other. How can there be any otherness if there are no boundaries between consciousnesses? I shall make clear how Husserl and Nishida struggled with this fundamental problem. First, I interpret the “unbounded”character of consciousness as“non-contexutuality”.On the basis of this discussion, I present the basic question concerning the other experienced in consciousness. Second, I examine how Husserl addressed this question. The early Husserl tried to deal with this problem on the basis of his idea of“pure consciousness”which was construed as something “indefinite”.The collapse of this idea motivated Husserl to develop his later concept of“primal I”(Ur-Ich). Third, I discuss how Nishida dealt with the same question. After he tackled this problem in his early theory of“pure experience”，he would overcome this attempt in his later article“I and Thou”，which seems to stress the non-contextual encounter with otherness.
