1996 Volume 2 Pages 91-108
Nuclear energy policy and the decision-making process for its formulation with regard to the degree of “citizen participation” is a widely debated issue in Japan, where macro-level policies such as energy policy are shaped exclusively by the technocrats. This paper explores an alternative process of policy formulation through the analysis of the political process leading to the enactment of California’s “Warren-Alquist Act” as amended in 1976. This act legislated a “nuclear moratorium” prior to the occurrence of major nuclear accidents such as TMI and Chernobyl. This analysis traces the process by which the issue of nuclear power was constructed, studied and debated in the legislature and other public arenas, drawing on interviews with those involved in the process. In order to construct the issue and to achieve the goal of nuclear power regulation, it was crucial, it is argued, that different public arenas be utilized in each phase of the political process. The public arena provided by the system of direct legislation or the “initiative” system in California was especially significant.
In the course of the political process that produced the “Warren-Alquist Act” as its final output, the direct-democracy system or “initiative” system, which enables ordinary citizens to write legislation, served as the central arena in which nuclear energy evolved anew as a controversial issue; in other words, it sustained the anti-nuclear or nuclear-skeptical public discourse and managed to win public attention. By doing so, it enabled sympathizers in the other important arena -the legislative body- to take up this issue, which had been regarded as untouchable under previous political power relationships. The legislature then took the role of the investigator by holding a comprehensive series of public hearings, mobilizing its resources -the most crucial of which is its authority- and laying out the “facts” about nuclear power. These findings were accepted by the public as non-biased, cold facts because they were presented to them through the legislature, the authoritative arena. While this issue successfully emerged as a topic in the media, the legislature came up with an alternative measure to regulate nuclear power. This measure, which excluded already-operating plants and protected industries’ vested interests, managed to present itself as the only alternative to the stricter proposition, and hence the nuclear industry finally accepted it.
The case analyzed in this paper illustrates the effectiveness of the “public arena model” proposed by Hilgartner and Bosk, which emphasizes the competition and selection of social problems in, and feedback among, various arenas of public discourse, but also requires the consideration of the social and economic environment at the macro-level for a full accounting.
