自由応募論文
真理の多元主義は実質性を保てるか
―ドメイン概念の不備を指摘し真理の多元主義を批判する―
2020 年 53 巻 1 号 p. 1-24
詳細
2020 年 53 巻 1 号 p. 1-24
Truth pluralism is a theory of truth stating that truth is realized in more than one manner. This theory has two goals: (1) to provide a model that can cope with every truth-apt proposition while accommodating the merit of each monist position and (2) to demonstrate that truth is substantive. To achieve these goals, truth pluralism depends on three theoretical tools: minimalism concerning truth-aptitude, platitude, and domain. In this paper, I will demonstrate how truth pluralism fails to achieve its goals since its theoretical tools are beset by some serious issues. Finally, I indicate the correct manner of truth pluralism to achieve the desired goals.
