2021 年 53 巻 2 号 p. 191-213
The issue of (in)compatibility between presentism and time travel has intrigued many philosophers for the last few decades. Keller and Nelson  have argued that, if presentism is a feasible theory of time that applies to ordinary (non-time travel) cases, then it should be compatible with time travel. Bigelow  and Sider , on the other hand, have independently argued that the idea of time travel contradicts the presentist conception of time because it involves the ʻspatialisation of timeʼ (in a metaphysical sense), which is something that presentists should resist. In support of the latter claim, I offer a new argument via a different route. More specifically, I clarify basic components of the view that I take as ʻorthodoxʼ presentism by examining how presentists have considered temporal notions of the existence of things and their property possession. It is because of these notions that presentists can sensibly maintain a dynamic theory of time and should not believe in time travel.