2002 年 35 巻 2 号 p. 1-14
In a famous essay entitled 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', W. V. O. Quine rejected two important doctrines that had been supported by many empiricists. One is the doctrine that a clear distinction can be made between analytic and synthetic statements. The other is the doctrine that every meaningful statement can be reduced to some statement constructed of terms which refer to immediate experience.
In this paper, I intend to rehabilitate analyticity, syntheticity and reductionism. First, analyticity is separated from apriority and necessity, and then the reason is given why I regard holism of 'Two Dogmas' as the verificationist one . Next, I survey the views of H. Putnam and J. J. Katz . In the following section, two viewpoints, dynamic and static points of view, are introduced into the arguments in question . On these considerations, I specify the contexts to which the above three notions are applied, although trivial or narrow in the range.