自然的なものと人工的なもの

ウィギンズにおける人格

抄録

Against the prevalence of the social construct view that the concept of a person is a social artifact like that of a nation, most notably David Wiggins offers a more naturalist alternative. He compares "person" to a natural kind term as it is elucidated according to the theory of direct reference, and restricts in effect the extent of personality to the animal kingdom. In this paper I shall examine his proposal and argue for an intermediate position; the concept of a person is much closer to a natural kind concept than social construct theorists maintain, but not so close as Wiggins suggests. Indeed, the social constructionism and Wiggins's naturalism are just two consequences of the untenable ontological dichotomy of natural things as real and artifacts as nominal. A better understanding of the concept of a person requires much deeper appreciation of the reality of natural-cum-artifactual kinds of things.