抄録
Abstract:
This paper demonstrates how Arrow’s theorem formulates not only a social decision process
but also serves to clarify moral rules; further, that such an interpretation is consistent with
conventional understanding due to Arrow’s methodology that “the scientific method can elucidate
ethical problems.” In order to achieve this aim, this paper traces the development of
Arrow’s theory by examining the debate between Arrow and Bergson and Little, among others.
We then argue that Arrow seeks to scientifically prove moral rules, in contrast to Bergson,
whose economic theory cannot effectively address ethical problems. Finally, we apply Arrow’s
methodology to the more general problem of the relationship between economics and
philosophy.
The structure of this paper is as follows: In Section II, we present the relationship between
science and value in welfare economics prior to the publication of Social Choice and
Individual Values (SCIV） in 1951. In Section III, we clarify that science and ethics-or the
elucidations of the social decision process and of social welfare-appear in the first edition
of SCIV. Section IV presents Bergson and Little’s criticism that Arrow does not methodologically
ground the relationship between science and ethics. In Section V, we clarify Arrow’s
methodological foundation and how it is affected by Popper’s thought, expressed in the statement
“scientific theories can elucidate ethical problems.” In Section VI, we check Arrow’s
methodology in the second edition of SCIV, published in 1963. Finally, Section VII demonstrates
that Arrow considered social preference as a moral rule based on his methodology in
the second edition of SCIV.
JEL classification numbers: B 23, B 41, D71.
