ポテンシャルゲームを用いたリスク選択の認知モデル

アレの背理における交差的注目の実証データの再検討

抄録

This paper studied cognitive modeling based on the cross attentional network for gamble comparison tasks developed by Indo (2013, 2014a, 2016b) by reanalyzing the empirical data and connecting it to the game theoretical model first studied in transportation network optimization. Cross attention potentials are rank values of reported strength concerning (i.e., markedness) each ordered pair of possible outcomes of two lotteries. By reanalyzing the experimental data of cross attention potential in the Allais paradox, this paper proves a relationship between shift of risk attitude to the orientation (i.e., spin) of cross attention network. This network model of cognitive cross attention can be translated into potential games, especially a congestion game, and then transformed into the Braess paradox, which predicts suboptimal flow caused by selfish behavior.