対人地雷禁止条約形成のゲーム論モデル

抄録

Treaty (Ottawa Treaty) in 1997 was a culmination of the transnational civil movements against landmines, which encouraged the change from the status quo (no regulation) to a drastic state (total ban). This case is alleged to show the power of transnational civil movements, providing a strong case for constructivists: Constructivists claim that the advocated norms against anti-personal landmines changed the preferences and behaviors of the states which had initially been unwilling to the establishment of the treaty, A major setback of this constructivist claim is that it is unverifiable, since the source of the change is attributed to unobservable variables like norms. This research offers an alternative, rationalist explanation for the radical change, examining observable, external constraints the states face.
Its main finding is that the change of attitudes that led to a regulatory regime (treaty) is better explained by the rules of procedure employed in the treaty negotiation than the diffusion of norms.
Applying the “agenda-setter model” in game theory, this research explores the validity of the above thesis under rationalist assumptions. Examination of each possible contingencies enables us to find a set of parameters that leads to a radical departure from the status quo, such as the one observed in the Ottawa process.