交渉による内戦終結と領域的権力分掌の陥穽

モザンビーク内戦とアンゴラ内戦の比較を通じて

抄録

Peace agreements do not necessarily end civil wars. Previous research shows that nearly half of the agreements reached between 1949 and 1992 failed to bring about peace. Why do some agreements produce peace while others fail to prevent violence from breaking out again? To answer this theoretical question, the present paper compares the peace process in Mozambique with the two peace processes in Angola. For all the common historical and regional contexts, the contrasting outcomes of these peace processes were striking. In Mozambique, the Rome Accords in 1992 succeeded in ending its civil war whereas in Angola neither the Bicesse Accords in 1991 nor the Lusaka Accords do so.
The comparison of these three peace processes reveals that the post-civil war institutions should be designed to mitigate the fear of the politically weak. Former military adversaries must agree to peacefully coexist with each other as political rivals. Therefore, some guarantee of the security and vital interests for the weak would be crucial to achieve peace. Exactly for this purpose, power-sharing agreements keep the politically strong from monopolizing power in the political, military and territorial dimension. And this is why the territorial power sharing in the Rome Accords enabled the RENAMO to accept its disarmament in Mozambique. Even after the defeat in the presidential and parliamentary elections, they complied with this agreement.
But, the guarantee of territorial autonomy is not a panacea. In Angola, an agreement of territorial power sharing might have effectively eased the anxiety of the weak. Nevertheless, the strong hesitated to concede territorial autonomy to the weak. Why? The strong were afraid that the weak might take advantage of the natural resources in their territory in increasing its own power in their favor. This could destabilize the postwar order. Therefore, the absence of territorial autonomy kept the UNITA from complying with the peace accords. This is the essence of what I call the pitfall of territorial autonomy.