日本の仲介外交と日英摩擦

マレーシア紛争をめぐる日本外交と日英協議、一九六三–六六年

抄録

In the early postwar period as instability across Southeast Asia threatened to engulf the region, Japan and Great Britain frequently took divergent approaches vis-à-vis regional geopolitical developments. Indonesia's belligerent policy of militarily and politically confronting Malaysia from 1963-66 can be seen as a clear case in point where Japan and Britain saw a potentially dangerous crisis in a starkly different light, quickly becoming a point of contention between diplomatic officials in Tokyo and London.
While Britain responded forcefully in military terms to the increasingly bellicose Sukarno by massing troops along the Malaysian side of the Borneo border, Japan saw such a hard-line approach as fraught with danger. Diplomatic officials in Tokyo saw this risky approach by Britain as not only risking war in a region strategically vital for Japan, but also as probably hastening Indonesia's leftward drift towards communist China. Moreover, Japanese officials were aware that too much external pressure on Indonesia may cause the nation to politically implode, a scenario seen as bringing the Indonesian communists to power (the PKI) and thus threatening Japan's substantial commercial investments in this country. Due to these high stakes involved for Japan, it decided to pursue a sustained policy of mediation between the key disputants.
During this period of Indonesian Confrontation (‘Konfrontasi’), Japan also exasperated Britain by continuing to trade with Indonesia and by providing financial aid and investment. The Commonwealth countries that had come to Malaysia's defence (Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand) all periodically expressed the hope that Japan would use its growing commercial influence to bring pressure to bear on Indonesia to peacefully accept Malaysia. Japan however, seeing its future economic relationship with Indonesia as a key priority resisted these calls to use its aid as leverage to modify Indonesia's belligerent stance towards its smaller neighbour. This led to British officials in particular to criticize Japan over what they perceived as an overly conciliatory approach toward Indonesia.
Undoubtedly, their markedly divergent policy approaches towards this Southeast Asian crisis did not help the warming of Anglo-Japanese postwar relations. Fortunately however, both sides saw enough utility in the broader relationship to not allow this issue to adversely affect bilateral relations. This ostensibly led to a grudging mutual acceptance that both Japan and Britain would frequently see the Southeast Asian region in a different light.
Therefore, despite their disagreements over how to deal with Sukarno and contain Confrontation, the relationship survived intact with no permanent damage being done. This was graphically shown by the first high-level meeting between Japan and Britain shortly after the conclusion of Confrontation, where both sides had the good grace to barely raise the issue and instead focus on the many commonalities in their respective world views.