イラク戦後移行期のアラブ諸国とイラクの冷たい関係

—安全保障環境とアラブ主義の変容の視点から—

抄録

After the war on Iraq in 2003, neighbouring Arab countries kept a distance from Iraq. Although diplomatic relationship of all the Arab countries was normalized with Iraq after the transfer of sovereignty in 2004, their diplomatic presence was kept at a relatively low profile.
The cold relationship between them was caused by the transformation in security circumstances and Arabism. With regard to the security circumstances, the democratic domino theory, advocated by the U.S. government, was considered a threat by authoritarian Arab states, since it might have potentially exposed their own political power to danger. After the war, not only did extreme federalism in Iraq accelerate their fear of the partition of Iraq but also the newly established Iraqi government was deemed too weak and incompetent to deal with insurgents and stabilize Iraq. Iraq, consequently, became the country that might open the way to regional destabilization in the eyes of Arab states. At the same time, actors in the Iraqi political arena changed substantially as a result of the collapse of the Saddam regime, the impact of which was most apparent on the transformation in Arabism in Iraq. The draft of the new Iraqi constitution ratified in the National Assembly in 2005 did not stipulate clearly that Iraq was a part of the Arab nations. In addition, Iran rapidly developed close friendly relationships with Iraq, leveraging lucratively their connections with Iraqi politicians, formed when those politicians had formerly been dissident activists. This stirred up fear among Arab states that Iran was expanding its political clout in Iraq, which they felt must be part of the Arab world.
On the other hand, the new Iraqi leaders were extremely distrustful of Arab governments, because they felt that the Arabs had turned a blind eye to the cruel oppression by Saddam against his own people. The Iraqi government also repeatedly criticized Arab countries, accusing them of sending Arab insurgents to Iraq who were thwarting the stabilization of Iraq. The Iraqi leaders recognized Arab countries as threats to their own security.
However, after signs of security improvement and embeddedness of a new political system in Iraq, Arab states have begun to show gradual involvement in Iraq since the summer of 2008. Even though the transformations are undesirable for Arabs, they do not have the power to alter the reality. Five years after the war could be the time required for them to accept the new reality.