国際通貨システムの動揺期におけるイギリスのポンド政策

―スターリング協定成立過程、一九六五―一九六八年―

抄録

This article explores how the British government developed its sterling holding policy to prevent the sterling area from decreasing sterling balances from 1965 to 1968 through focusing on the policy making process between the Treasury and the Bank of England. As a result, the paper may reveal consistent principles when Britain decided this policy. The British government started to take the issue seriously in 1965, when the sterling area began to diversify their reserves away from sterling. Britain regarded this action as one of critical factors led to the sterling crisis. Until the devaluation of sterling, the Bank of England and the Treasury considered some extreme policies such as blocking, which was against the rule of the Bretton Woods system and had a negative impact on the international monetary system. Moreover, some people in the government preferred floating. However, these policies were rejected, and alternative moderate policies were chosen, such as improving the balance of payment and getting central bank cooperation. This was because the government was too afraid of the collapse of the international monetary system. Therefore, even if Britain bore the burden of the sterling as an international currency, the government had no other choice but to do so.

After the 1967 devaluation, while the British government totally agreed with new central bank cooperation, there was a sharp difference of opinion between the Treasury and the Bank of England about the way to operate an exchange guarantee to the sterling area. Although the former argued for issuing dollar-denominated or sterling area local currency bonds to lighten the burden about stability of the international monetary system as much as possible, the latter preferred a formal exchange guarantee because this policy was more acceptable to the sterling area. Finally, the British government, which had hoped to avoid failure of bilateral negotiation with the sterling area, opted a formal exchange guarantee in spite of increasing the burden.

After that, the British government, whose position at negotiation with the sterling area was too vulnerable, was forced to concede to most conditions. For example, the charge for the guarantee was abolished. However, Britain continued to try to reach an agreement within two months to avoid collapse of the international monetary system. Finally, the Basle Agreement and the Sterling Agreements of 1968 were completed, and they especially contributed to stability of the sterling and the international monetary system.

In conclusion, the British government gave priority to stability of the international monetary system rather than lightening the burden of the sterling as an international currency. This attitude originated from fear of breaking down the existing international monetary system, which was a base for the Western countries.