米中接近における沖縄ファクターの検討

――米国の対中作戦計画と中国の不干渉――

抄録

This article aims to clarify the effect of the US-Japan agreement in 1969, especially concerning the removal and reintroduction of nuclear weapons in Okinawa under the US-China rapprochement. The focus of previous studies was mainly on the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Okinawa and how it affected reconciliation between the US and China. However, nuclear restoration in Okinawa and its significant effect on US-China relations have not been discussed. Revealing concealed historical facts, this paper explores a new document of the Minutes among Henry Kissinger and Zhou Enlai in October 1971, focusing on the specific part regarding the reintroduction of nuclear weapons to Okinawa, which was disclosed in 2014, far later than the other sections. Specifically, I shed new light on the “Okinawa Factors”—the reversion of Okinawa without nuclear weapons and the reintroduction of nuclear weapons to Okinawa bases under the 1969 Japan-US agreement—analyzing US Operational Plan (OPLAN) and Chinese policy. In short, this thesis argues that maintaining the use of bases and nuclear weapons in Okinawa enables the US to approach China without changing its OPLAN. China did not interfere in the re-entry of nuclear weapons to Okinawa because they assumed the probability of nuclear war with the US was low, rather, they prioritized improving relations with the US.

Since China successfully detonated its first atomic bomb in 1964, the US raised threat perception associated with China as opposed to the peripheral threat of the USSR. In this context, the Okinawa base was regarded as one of the most important sorties and military supplies to attack China. Through the negotiation of the Okinawa Reversion in 1969, the US military kept operating the bases in Okinawa without prior consultation with Japan. The Nixon administration attempted to move closer to China in order to contain the USSR and honorably withdraw from the war in Vietnam. At the same time, the Chinese government shifted its strategy to be hostile towards the USSR and to approach the US. Kissinger visited China in July 1971, holding an OPLAN against China with regard to the use of bases and nuclear weapons in Okinawa. During the conference in October, Zhou pointed out the possibility of reintroducing nuclear weapons to the Okinawa bases. Kissinger acknowledged the possibility while emphasizing the non-nuclear status of Okinawa. Despite concerns for the US nuclear capacity, China became a bystander to observe the reintroduction of nuclear weapons based on the low likelihood of the US-led nuclear war against China as well as a willingness to enhance relations with the US. The Okinawa bases secured the US military capability against China without alarming China, and therefore, Okinawa can be viewed as a mediator in facilitating the US-China rapprochement.