In the last three decades after the end of the Cold War, historical research on international relations during the Cold War period has made remarkable progress. This special issue aims to examine the impact of the Cold War on Japanese diplomacy, Japan’s involvement and roles in the Cold War, and the impact of Japanese diplomacy on the Cold War from various perspectives in the study of diplomatic and international relations history, considering recent trends in postwar Japanese diplomatic history and Cold War history research.

As the introduction, this article looks back at the development of postwar Japanese diplomatic history research in connection with that of Cold War history research. The brief overview shows that the former’s scope of research continued to expand with the improvement of access to documentary sources in Japan and abroad. As a result, empirical research on the relationship between Japanese diplomacy and the Cold War has progressed. The advancement and transformation of Cold War history research in recent years facilitated such progress in postwar Japanese diplomatic history research, which, in turn, has the potential to significantly contribute to the former’s development. However, postwar Japanese diplomatic historians in Japan have not vigorously studied the relationship between Japanese diplomacy and the Cold War.

In light of this research trend, this special issue attempts to bridge Cold War studies and postwar Japanese diplomatic history research. To this end, this article proposes a research program to study the relationship between the Cold War and Japanese diplomacy, which consists of eight patterns to connect them. They are categorized by their primary research subjects and research approach. The former includes U.S-Soviet relations, the Cold War in Asia, the Cold War in the Third World, intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations, significant events and issues in postwar Japanese diplomatic history, and important events and issues in Cold War history. Pursuing such a research program would revitalize postwar Japanese diplomatic history research in Japan and make it more attractive from a global perspective.

This special issue gathers eight featured articles. Each connects the Cold War and Japanese diplomacy from its distinctive perspective and attempts to provide new insights into Japanese diplomacy during the Cold War. What emerges is a multifaceted and multilayered picture of Japanese diplomacy during the Cold War, which cannot be captured by a single image of “Cold War beneficiary” or a dichotomous picture of cooperation with and independence from the US. The featured article exemplifies how linking the Cold War with Japanese diplomacy can open up new possibilities for studying postwar Japanese diplomatic history and Cold War history.

Historians of Cold War international relations have rarely discussed the significance of social democracy in an international context. Recent exceptions have shed light on the non-communist socialist internationalism within Europe, focusing on the Socialist International (SI), yet little is known about the fact that the social democratic network was not limited to Europe but expanded globally. In addition, historians of modern Japanese politics have not paid much attention to the Japan Socialist Party (JSP)’s relations with international social democratic networks, to which the JSP attached great importance.

To fill these gaps, this article deals with the JSP’s relationship with the organization of West European social democratic parties—the SI and its predecessor Comisco—in the late 1940s and the early 1950s. It argues that the JSP’s so-called ‘peace debate (kōwa ronsō)’ of the same period, in which they fought over Japan’s postwar peace treaty and security pact with the US, was greatly influenced by the Cold War policies of Comisco/the SI.

Among the main factions of the JSP, the rightists, who supported pro-West Cold War policies, wished to promote cooperation with European socialists due to their ideological proximity and the need to compete with the leftists, who tended to be neutralists in the East-West conflict. As a result of the rightists’ effort, the JSP was admitted to Comisco in 1950.

Comisco published its first official statement on international security, the ‘resolution on socialism and peace,’ in June 1950. Then the JSP, especially the rightists, began to refer to Comisco’s international policy in the intra-party ‘peace debate,’ which was ignited by the outbreak of the Korean War. Specifically, Comisco and the JSP rightists supported the central role of the United Nations in international peace and advocated anti-communism and pro-West position in the Cold War.

Comisco was reorganized into the SI at the Frankfurt Congress in the middle of 1951, where they published a statement prioritizing military defense against communist aggression. Taking advantage of the SI’s prestige, the rightists succeeded in forming a partnership with the centrists, declaring to support the SI’s Cold War policy. However, disappointed with the SI, the leftists began to approach Asian socialists, many of whom supported neutralism in the Cold War, resulting in the foundation of the Asian Socialist Conference. Failing to compromise, the JSP was split into two parties in October 1951.

In short, the JSP’s intra-party controversy was about defining ‘social democratic foreign policy’ in the Cold War, and the same question caused friction among non-communist socialists across the world. In this sense, the JSP’s left-right dispute was in the context not only of Japanese political history but also of the history of global social democratic network in the Cold War period.

From 1955 to 1956, Japan conducted a series of negotiations with the Soviet Union to normalize the bilateral relations.

By carefully analyzing already declassified and newly found archival documents, including the Soviet ones, this article re-examines the Japan-Soviet Normalization Talks and investigates how Soviet’s, the US’s, and Japan’s negotiation strategies interacted. The focus here is how the main actors of the talks understood Japan’s position under the Cold War differently.

Japan and the US carefully prepared for the talks through consultation in advance. Here, both Japan and the US did not expect the Soviet Union would make any territorial concession. In early August 1955, however, the Soviet leadership abruptly made an unexpected proposal on Habomai and Shikotan “in connection with other problems.” This proposal substantially changed the overall flow of the talks. It made the US’s two main strategies (one is supporting Japan’s request on Habomai and Shikotan, the other is preventing Japan from recognizing Soviet’s sovereignty over South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands) incompatible because any territorial demarcation and conclusion of the peace treaty mean de facto recognition of Soviet’s sovereignty.

The US could afford a Japan-Soviet Peace Treaty, but it did not do so because the Soviet proposal was, in a nutshell, a proposal on the mutual recognition of Yalta and San Francisco, which was not an option within the US’s Cold War strategy. The US had Japanese attention attracted away from the Soviet proposal, offering the aide-memoire on Kunashiri and Etorofu, explicitly supporting Japan’s legitimacy over them in a historical, though not in a legal sense. Renewed ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s doctrine on the Talks dragged PM Hatoyama back from concluding the talks by putting off the territorial problem. Thus the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration itself became the symbol of a split between Japan and the Soviet Union, representing different interpretations of the possibility of continued negotiation of Kunashiri and Etorofu.

In the concluding section, the author summarizes the main findings of this research. The author argues that consciously or unconsciously, Japanese policy makers have made an important choice through these talks to be “a gainer from the Cold War” by being a contributing factor to the US Cold War Strategy, not by balancing between the two superpowers. For the Soviet Union, this meant one major setback in the peaceful coexistence policy in East Asia.

This paper focuses on the fact that two bilateral agreements (UK-Japan and US-Japan) concerning the peaceful use of nuclear energy were concluded on the same day, June 16, 1958. Why did Japan and the UK conclude such an agreement, which entailed the risk of deteriorating their relationship with the US, as the agreement clearly obstructed the US’s Cold War strategy? Why and how were these two agreements concluded on the same day? I try to answer these questions by scrutinizing the diplomatic records.

The first section reveals that Japan approached the UK regarding the possibility of cooperation in the fall of 1955, mainly to avoid sole dependence on the US. On the other hand, the UK approached Japan not only regarding the economic matter of exporting its nuclear reactors but also regarding political interests, such as the restoration of its status as a great world power. The author suggests that for the UK and Japan, their agreement was a means of seeking autonomous foreign policy, independent from the US.

However, as the second section shows, the US began to intervene with both countries and succeeded in diminishing their eagerness for the agreement. The UK and Japan decided to place the highest priority on recovering and enhancing their relationship with the US. The preliminary negotiations between the UK and Japan began in September 1957, but they would soon be stuck due to their distrust for each other.

The third section was an analysis of the process of two bilateral agreements that were concluded on the same day. The US-Japan negotiations began in January 1958 and quickly reached a provisional signature on April 28. The US and Japan also planned to reach the formal signature on May 27; however, it was postponed for various reasons. Although the UK-Japan negotiation was finalized on May 20, both countries had lost their eagerness for cooperation, and neither could find a reason to rush to signature. Therefore, Japan took the initiative to adjust the two agreements so that they were concluded on the same day, June 16, 1958.

Finally, this paper points out that the outcome of the UK-Japan bilateral agreement was not expected before the negotiation; however, both countries achieved their political agendas with the US soon after the date of the signature. By considering these processes, the author concluded that the original goal of autonomous foreign policy shifted to limited or partial autonomous foreign policy, which was subordinated to the U.S.-led Cold War system.

Japan started emphasizing multilateral economic cooperation to improve its international status as a developed country in the early 1960s. In 1960, Japan joined the Development Assistance Group (DAG) in the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) which provided economic assistance to developing countries. In 1962, Japan participated in the Group of 10 (G10) which cooperated to strengthen the international monetary system with other developed countries. In 1963, it accepted the U.S. proposition to start a trade negotiation for the Kennedy Round in the following year. In 1964, it became a member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

The OECD became a key institution for Japan since it served as a forum to coordinate economic policies in member countries and to improve its international status. Japan was the only non-European, non-North American, non-Atlantic and the first Asian member country in the OECD. Japan’s OECD membership appeared to be symbolic rather than a substantive status. The symbolic context was significant not only for Japan, but also for other OECD member countries.

Japan expected its OECD membership negotiation would become a step to solve Western European countries’ discriminative trade policies toward the country. Since its growing exports threatened other countries’ domestic industries, Western countries hesitated to provide Japan the Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) status even after it became a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This was a typical case in the logic of international trade that countries generally apply the free trade principle but occasionally abandon the principle to stabilize domestic economy.

Western countries considered Japan’s OECD accession to strengthen the multilateral relationship between them and Japan in the Cold War and the declining U.S. economic power. Since the sharp deterioration of the U.S. balance of payment caused fear of a dollar crisis, Western countries attempted to share the burden with ally countries in defending the value of the dollar in the “free world” without a “free ride”. To address the issue of international burden sharing under the Cold War and the dollar crisis, developed countries strengthened their cooperation. Such cooperation among countries influenced Japan’s OECD membership. This paper discusses how the issues of the Cold War, international trade, and international finance affected Japan’s OECD membership to share the burden in defending the dollar value and supporting the U.S. strategy in the early 1960s.

This article aims to clarify the effect of the US-Japan agreement in 1969, especially concerning the removal and reintroduction of nuclear weapons in Okinawa under the US-China rapprochement. The focus of previous studies was mainly on the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Okinawa and how it affected reconciliation between the US and China. However, nuclear restoration in Okinawa and its significant effect on US-China relations have not been discussed. Revealing concealed historical facts, this paper explores a new document of the Minutes among Henry Kissinger and Zhou Enlai in October 1971, focusing on the specific part regarding the reintroduction of nuclear weapons to Okinawa, which was disclosed in 2014, far later than the other sections. Specifically, I shed new light on the “Okinawa Factors”—the reversion of Okinawa without nuclear weapons and the reintroduction of nuclear weapons to Okinawa bases under the 1969 Japan-US agreement—analyzing US Operational Plan (OPLAN) and Chinese policy. In short, this thesis argues that maintaining the use of bases and nuclear weapons in Okinawa enables the US to approach China without changing its OPLAN. China did not interfere in the re-entry of nuclear weapons to Okinawa because they assumed the probability of nuclear war with the US was low, rather, they prioritized improving relations with the US.

Since China successfully detonated its first atomic bomb in 1964, the US raised threat perception associated with China as opposed to the peripheral threat of the USSR. In this context, the Okinawa base was regarded as one of the most important sorties and military supplies to attack China. Through the negotiation of the Okinawa Reversion in 1969, the US military kept operating the bases in Okinawa without prior consultation with Japan. The Nixon administration attempted to move closer to China in order to contain the USSR and honorably withdraw from the war in Vietnam. At the same time, the Chinese government shifted its strategy to be hostile towards the USSR and to approach the US. Kissinger visited China in July 1971, holding an OPLAN against China with regard to the use of bases and nuclear weapons in Okinawa. During the conference in October, Zhou pointed out the possibility of reintroducing nuclear weapons to the Okinawa bases. Kissinger acknowledged the possibility while emphasizing the non-nuclear status of Okinawa. Despite concerns for the US nuclear capacity, China became a bystander to observe the reintroduction of nuclear weapons based on the low likelihood of the US-led nuclear war against China as well as a willingness to enhance relations with the US. The Okinawa bases secured the US military capability against China without alarming China, and therefore, Okinawa can be viewed as a mediator in facilitating the US-China rapprochement.

In the 1960s, when students were protesting against authority, domestic political conflicts and the transformation of the Cold War were closely interrelated. The student protests as a transnational phenomenon occurred not only in the Western Bloc but also in the Eastern Bloc. Because the social dynamics of the 1960s cast a shadow on the years from the late 1950s to the early 1970s, the period came to be known as the “Long Sixties”. Did a similar phenomenon occur in the Third World? How did Japan’s diplomacy react to it?

This paper reappraises the anti-Japan riots that broke out in Thailand and Indonesia in 1974 from the perspective of the Cold War and student movements in the Long Sixties. During Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka’s visit to Southeast Asia in January 1974, students in Thailand organized demonstrations and subversive activities. In Indonesia also, protests against Tanaka were radicalized, resulting in the Malari incident with many deaths and arrests.

Previous studies have argued that Japan’s excessive economic presence, so called “over-presence”, induced the riots. However, some studies using newly declassified historical records argue that the riots were outbursts of public opposition to the developmental dictatorships in the two Southeast Asian countries, and that Japan’s economic expansion was used as a scapegoat by protesters. However, these studies focus on their bilateral economic relations with Japan and their domestic political systems without shedding light on the transformation of the international order in Southeast Asia or the structural changes in domestic societies.

In contrast, this paper argues that the anti-Japan riots were consequences of the loss of legitimacy of the pro-U.S. anti-communist administrations in Thailand and Indonesia caused by the transformation of the Cold War, and of civil resistance to authoritarian rule propelled by social modernization. This paper, therefore, argues the anti-Japan riots were part of the transnational student movement in the Long Sixties because it was brought by civic-minded students who were against social injustice under authoritarianism.

This paper also reveals that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA) chose “over-presence” theory as the basis to promote cultural diplomacy, which was a new policy toward Southeast Asia. In addition, without taking into account the actualities of Long Sixties on these countries, MOFA tried to alleviate anti-Japan sentiment by focusing on practical measures in the economic and cultural spheres. This policy and the diplomatic concepts of Takeo Fukuda fused into the Fukuda Doctrine. When the Fukuda Doctrine was announced, however, the Long Sixties in both countries had come to an end without producing any fundamental political change.

This paper examines Japan’s stance on Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) II by analyzing Japan’s reactions to the briefings by the U.S. and the U.S.-Japan consultations on strategic issues. While previous studies have covered the U.S.-Japan relationship in the context of SALT, they have been limited in scope, focusing on only SALT I and the causes of the institutionalization of the U.S.-Japan alliance. This article uses diplomatic documents of the U.S. and Japan and focuses on Japan’s two positions on nuclear issues to address these situations. One is the “atomic bombed nation” that aims to promote anti-nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament. The other is the position as an “ally” that aims to improve the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrence against Japan and prioritizes its security.

Japan’s stance toward SALT was inconsistent. From the signing of SALT I to 1973, Japan mainly expressed its reactions as an “ally,” insisting that the credibility of the deterrent provided by the U.S. should not be diminished. However, this argument depended on individual factors. After the mid-1973, the consultation channels may have changed or disappeared, creating a different situation from the start of SALT II. The Japanese Embassy in Washington has received regular briefings, and the Office for Disarmament Affairs has only occasionally expressed its hopes as the “atomic bombed nation.” Simultaneously, SALT was also seen to resolve the issue of Japan’s ratification of the NPT, which was becoming a domestic issue. When the SALT II agreement was signed, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA) again began to express its concerns about the SALT agreement from the position of an “ally,” mainly because of the existence of the SS-20 that were not subject to SALT II limitations. This had already foreshadowed the Japanese diplomacy on the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces in the 1980s.

There are two conclusions in this paper. First, Japan tried to build a closer relationship with the U.S. regarding SALT II, but it was not long-lasting. It was different from SALT I in that there was an intention to affect SALT. The problem, however, was that this attitude was not rooted in the organization and remained personal. Second, Japan was the “atomic bombed nation” with little presence. However, in other words, the Japanese diplomacy on SALT is an example of Japan’s nuclear policy, which is described as “multi-sided.” The intersection of Japan’s two positions on nuclear weapons was not always in the same place. This feature is not contradictory if interpreted to the dependence on nuclear deterrence and the promotion of nuclear arms control in security policy. This conclusion indicates that Japanese diplomacy on SALT may be an example of the consistency between nuclear deterrence and nuclear disarmament that the MOFA shows today.

This article examines why the Japanese government supported South Korea’s efforts to postpone deliberations on North Korea’s application for the IMO membership in 1984.

The Nakasone administration valued Japan-South Korea relations and it appears likely that Japan would have been willing to cooperate with South Korea on foreign policy. However, since the 1970s, the Japanese government had consistently supported North Korea’s participation in international organizations and had been seeking to improve relations with North Korea, to stabilize the Korean Peninsula. Soon after the Rangoon bombing incident of 1983, Japan and the U.S. agreed not to push North Korea too hard, for fear of triggering dangerous military action, but to induce inter-Korean dialogue to ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Taking these facts into account, Japan’s decision to support Korea cannot be said to be self-evident. In addition, relatively few studies have been devoted to an analytic, detailed examination of how the Japanese government strived to achieve peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula during the Second Cold War.

In connection with these issues, I propose that Japan’s diplomacy during the Second Cold War was multifaceted in that it sought to achieve the goal of cooperation with friends and partners as a member of the Western camp while promoting easing tensions on the Korean Peninsula as a leader in Asia.

In consideration of major Western countries’ negative and skeptical attitudes toward North Korea, the Japanese government viewed that it was not desirable to immediately approve of North Korea’s membership in the IMO. However, the principle of universality in international organizations and the stability on the Korean Peninsula were pursued simultaneously by Japan. For instance, the Japanese government believed that Japan’s incitement of conflicts between the two Koreas would not only deteriorate Japan-North Korea relations but also hinder an environment conducive to the resumption of inter-Korean dialogue. Furthermore, the Japanese government remained unchanged in its position that North Korea’s participation in international cooperation could contribute to weakening North Korea’s belligerence in East Asia. Accordingly, the Japanese government agreed to support the postponement of deliberations on North Korea’s IMO membership. However, the Nakasone administration also considered it inappropriate for Japan to directly propose the postponement as requested by Korea.

It is generally acknowledged that Japan was not competent enough to end the Cold War in East Asia or resolve the Korean problem. Nevertheless, this study argues that Japan contributed to stability on the Korean Peninsula and in East Asia through bilateral and multilateral diplomacy during the Second Cold War. It is thus important to bear in mind the necessity of examining various aspects of Japanese diplomacy during the Cold War, in addition to examining Japan’s reluctant response to the Cold War structure.

Scholars have widely investigated the history of concepts of world order in the 20-century. Among those works, there has been literature on the history of world order in the mid-20th-century. This paper seeks to contribute to this scholarly trend by focusing on Toynbee’s vision of the post-war world order during the early period of WWII. Arnold J. Toynbee (1889–1975) is a British historian best-known for his book A Study of History. Accordingly, researchers have focused on his intellectual activities as a renowned historian and have paid little attention to another aspect as an expert on International Relations until recently. Therefore, while existing scholarship revealed some aspects of Toynbee’s intellectual activities in international relations, it did not adequately explore Toynbee’s arguments on world order during WWII. This paper approaches this hitherto neglected aspect of Toynbee. In particular, it unearths his vision of the post-WWII world order by drawing on such primary sources as articles, private papers and memoranda.

Toynbee was also a prominent scholar in international relations between the 1920s and the early 1950s in Britain and beyond. From 1925 to 1954, serving as Director of Studies at Chatham House, he published numerous relevant articles and books. Among these works, his Survey of International Affairs earned a significant reputation. As the chances of WWII increased, Toynbee dedicated much effort to organising the research network of British scholars to analyse international affairs. After the outbreak of the war, Toynbee was particularly dismayed by the surrender of France by Nazi Germany. He believed that world integration by Nazi Germany or English-speaking states would be achieved in future international relations. Therefore, Toynbee advocated for the necessity of forming a world order centred on the United States and the United Kingdom to counter German domination.

In the course of this paper, we will learn that during WWII, Toynbee thought the British-American leadership would be the foundation for the post-war world order. The study demonstrates that although Toynbee’s vision was designed to resist the existential threat of Nazi Germany to some extent, he also elucidated post-war world order from various perspectives at a global level: political values and regimes, international economic system, land-sea based geopolitics, and Anglo-American connection. It also argues that Toynbee held an imperial internationalist vision of world politics, endorsing the European mandate system created after WWI as auspices of human rights and the rule of law in less developed areas and projecting it into post-war international relations. In conclusion, closely examining this argument enables us to enhance our understanding of the history of the mid-20-century discourse on world order.