抑止失敗の外交政策理論

転換期の核抑止と軍備管理

抄録

This essay reviews the renewed strategic debate, with a particular focusing on the issue of deterrence failure. If nuclear deterrence should fail, how will it fail and why? In other words, what are the obstacles to a successful deterrence strategy? It is theoretically impossible to prove or falsify the success of deterrence strategy as long as no aggressive action is taken by an adversary. Only when an aggressive action is taken do we know that the strategy is not working.
Based on the various case studies conducted by Alexander L. George, John D. Steinbruner, Robert Jervis, and Richard Ned Lebow, part one of this paper discusses why and how deterrence failed in the past. The historical cases include the 1914 European crisis, the US-Japanese crisis prior to Pearl Harbor in 1941, and the Middle East conflict in 1973. Special attention is paid to the perceptual and psychological factors in the challenger's decision-making process. The evidence suggests that a deterrence strategy may be ineffective, risky, or, at worst, counter-productive under certain conditions. To avoid the tragedy of deterrence failure in the nuclear era, it is essential to maintain crisis stability so that no party has an incentive to launch a pre-emptive attack. Furthermore, it is argued that a strategy of deterrence must be supplemented by crisis prevention measures.
The second part of this paper examines why some strategists believe that strategic stability is undermined. We trace the arguments of Fred Charles Iklé, Colin Gray, and others with critical eyes. We also compare the key logic of the strategies with concept of Mutual Assured Destruction and of Limited Nuclear Options.
The last part of this essay examines which strategic concepts are valid for stable deterrence, and which concepts are invalid. Finally, we discuss the possibility of reassuring an adversary through the creation of “security regimes, ” as suggested by as Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Alexander L. George.