ソ連の朝鮮半島政策-「新思考」外交の文脈における朝鮮問題-
朝鮮半島の国際政治
1989 年 1989 巻 92 号 p. 31-45,L8
詳細
1989 年 1989 巻 92 号 p. 31-45,L8
Moscow's foreign policy has been undergoing a substantial change since Gorbachev's coming to power, with their policy toward the Korean Peninsula being no exception. In a sense its policy in this region can serve as a kind of touchstone to check the true character of the “New Thinking” diplomacy under Gorbachev.
There are two significant changes in the USSR's foreign policy strategy which exert an important influence on its policy line toward the Korean Peninsula. Firstly; Moscow's policy towards its Socialist allies, namely that of “do whatever you like if it serves the cause of Socialism.” Secondly; the Kremlin's policy in the Third World; one based upon the sober assumption that the future of Socialism looks extremely dark in this area. “Honesty coupled with modesty” and “realism not idealism” make up the main elements of the USSR's diplomacy.
Since 1984 Soviet-North Korean relations have seemed strengthened, especially in the security and defense fields. But, it now turns out that this apparent upgrading of the relationship is limited to military cooperation. The overall trend in the relationship still remains almost unchanged.
On the contrary, Moscow's rapprochement with South Korea is of greater importance. New developments instigated in 1988 in the relations between South Korea and the USSR and other Socialist countries are genuinely important. Now the USSR recognizes that there are complementary ties with NIEs.
Recent circumstantial evidence shows that the Kremlin's traditional negative stance on the “cross recognition” of the two Koreas is not categorical. This now depends upon factors such as the further warming-up of East-West relations and Sino-Soviet relations, the gap in economic power between North Korea and the South.
