冷戦の終結と朝鮮統一問題

冷戦とその後

抄録

“The end of the Cold War” could be paraphrased as “the revolution to U. S. -Soviet Joint Action” in regards to their policies towards the Korean Peninsula, recalling that the tragedy of the national division of Korea was brought about by the failure of “U. S. -Soviet Joint Action”. This meant the so-called “Cross Contact” in a situation where the enmity between North and South Korea transcended that between the U. S. and Soviet Union. The new international environment eventually resulted in the establishment of diplomatic ties between South Korea and Soviet Union. Accordingly, the comprehensive security framework in Asia and Pacific advocated by Gorbachev was largely localized, for Roh Tae-woo's initiatives for Nordpolitik were accompanied by proposals for an international conference regionally defined within Northeast Asia.
Roh Tae-woo's address before the U. N. General Assembly in 1988 signified an attempt to improve the inter-Korean relations. Roh, in his address, proposed to adopt a “nonaggression declaration” within “the framework of mutual trust and security”. For the declaration to have the effect of a formal nonaggression pact, the proposed framework would have to be defined in concrete measures.
In spite of Seoul's new initiative, however, there can be no real hope for advancing inter-Korean relations as long as North Korea sticks to the Tripartite Talks within which the North regards the talks between Pyongyang-Washington as the prerequisites for progress in unification issues. The policy speech made by Kim Il-sung in May 1990 was highly significant in that Pyongyang dropped its insistence on the Tripartite Talks.
Moreover, North Korea unveiled a disarmament proposal incorporating a number of measures for mutual confidence building. North Korea's plan was principally concerned with taking direct actions on the adoption of a nonaggression declaration and on phasing large-scale military cutback. But confidence-building measures, as South Korea is aware, are not intended to bring about automatic military cutbacks.
Although efforts to improve inter-Korean relations resulted in the commencement of High-level Talks, disparities remain unsolved even after the adoption of the comprehensive North-South accord. The actual accord, for example, endorsed Seoul's position emphasizing the implementation of confidence-building measures on the one hand, and endorses Pyongyangs' insistance on reducing armaments on the other.
The North-South accord provides a case where the European experience should be applied, localized though it may be, in that the accord has comprehensive contents as seen in the CSCE. North and South Korean are supposed to seek for a sort of bargaining with the main agenda moving within the framework.