ポスト冷戦期日本の安全保障政策

冷戦とその後

抄録

The future of the Japan-U. S. security alliance, which during the Cold War formed the basis of Japanese security policy (and foreign policy) is examined. During the Cold War period, the alliance moderated competition between both countries, as each side had an incentive to compromise in order to maintain the alliance. The degree to which the presence of a mutual threat (the Soviet Union) was responsible for this is subject to debate. In light of the declining Soviet threat and the rise of Japanese power vis-a-vis the United States, revisionists on both sides of the Pacific charge that the alliance is no longer necessary (or cannot be maintained) and that conflict between the rising power, Japan, and the declining hegemon, the United States, is inevitable in the post Cold-War world.
The article argues that hegemonic conflict between both countries is not inevitable and indeed is unlikely. Instead, a global Nichibei partnership, centered around the alliance is most likely. Continued cooperation with the United States remains Japan's only viable security option in the post Cold-War world. Both Japan and the United States will continue to value the alliance. But in response to changes in the international structure, the nature of the alliance will undergo some changes: military roles of the alliance will remain important (although less important than during Cold War era), while other functions of the alliance will assume added importance in providing for the comprehensive security of both nations and regional stability. Because of the continuing value of the alliance, it will also remain the “basic political framework for cooperation” between Japan and the United States in both bilateral and international matters, thereby moderating conflict between both nations.
The main threat to the alliance will arise from inequities in current burdensharing and powersharing arrangements. As Japan plays an increasingly more visible and proactive role in the maintenance of international order (increased burdensharing), it is dissatisfied with decisionmaking arrangements in the international order from which it often has little input. Such resentment could lead to a backlash of anti-U. S. nationalism among the rising generation of Japanese leaders (a scenario that resembles the 1920s when Japanese resentment at not being fully accepted into the great power “club” of nations helped play the government, cast adrift following the termination of the Anglo-Japan alliance, into the hands of Japanese ultra-nationalists in the 1930s). This is the only scenario under which Japan would directly challenge the United States. Whether or not the Japan-U. S. partnership succeeds will therefore depend ultimately on U. S. willingness to allow Japan a greater voice in international affairs. The outcome will have a major impact on the nature of the international order in the 21st century.