昭和十年代初めにおける国防国策の策定 -石原莞爾の国防構想を中心に-

抄録

In August 1935, Colonel Ishihara Kanji was appointed Chief of the Plans and Policy Division of the Army General Staff, and produced his concept of a grand politico-military strategy for Japan. This was the “Hokushin, Nanshin” (First North, then South) concept, and called for first focusing northwards and denying Soviet Russia's ambitions in Manchuria and northern China and excluding the British from east Asia, after which preparations for the expected decisive war in the south with the United States would be carried out. The Navy, however, opposed Ishihara's concept, because it felt Japan should concentrate on preparing for the war with the U. S. It expected to fight over control of the Pacific, and produced its own concept, which was “Hold in the north, and advance in the south.”
The highest authorities of the Army and Navy eventually jointly produced the “Kokusaku Taiko” (National Policy Guidelines), which called for concentrating simultaneously northwards and southwards, thus basically resolving none of the differences between the Army and Navy, and also the Third Revision of the National Defense Policy, which called for a short, decisive war against one opponent at a time in case of war. Since Ishihara could not agree with these plans, he submitted his own concept, mentioned above, as the “Kokubo Kokusaku Taiko” (National Defense and Political Policy), which called for the Army to direct the development of the military industrial capabilities necessary under Ishihara's plan in Armycontrolled Manchuria. This would enable Ishihara to realize his plans through the Army's efforts alone.
In March 1937, however, Ishihara's supporters in the General Staff and Army Ministry were transferred out, and Ishihara himself was transferred after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese Incident in July. As a result, Ishihara's plan faded away without being realized.