In contemporary Okinawan history studies, attention has largely focused on events in the political process of the reversion to Japan in 1972 and thus presenting the image that Okinawan postwar history can be neatly divided into two distinct eras. Recently, however, this premise has been questioned in light of the rape incident of 1995 and recent political issues, which show that pre-1972 problems remain almost three decades later. The U. S. -Japan military security regime has consistently been the main factor that fetters democracy and self-reliance in Okinawa throughout both periods.
This thesis proceeds from the premise above, and the author maintain that the basic foundation of relations and issues in postwar Okinawa until the present day originates after the Battle of Okinawa in 1945. The U. S. Forces inherited, occupied and developed the military air bases on Ie Island, central and south west coast of Okinawa Island (where U. S. Forces are based now) which the Japanese Army had constructed in the early 1940's. The surviving Okinawans interned in camps in the Northern area were not permitted to return to their homes and rebuild their villages.
On 15 August, the U. S. military government established the Advisory Council of Okinawa to rebuild government functions, a body composed of fifteen Okinawan representatives chosen by the Okinawan leaders and the American authorities. Although the Council was an organization hand-picked by the U. S. military government from above and no more than a sup-port group for the occupation, the debates in the Council went beyond the implementation of administrative policies. According to the records, the Council sought “self-government” institutions including the separation of police powers, war reparation from the Japanese government, freedom of speech. and press, popular elections for the democratic governmental body, and the proposition of a constitution for Okinawa. These debates were primarily focused on the situation inherited from Japanese rule, in which the Okinawans became enmeshed in the modern Japanese state system not as a colony, yet as a marginalized group within an imperialist power.
The demands for political change, however, did not last long. The events in the weeks after the surrender of Japan between August and October 1945 shuttered them. From late September to early October, the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff designated the military bases in Okinawa as a “primary base, ” for possible air base sites in the American overseas base system, and examined the possibility of exclusive rule. The U. S. Military Government in Okinawa changed the orientation of its “self-government” program and ignored the debates formerly discussed by the Advisory Council. Moreover, the military government suppressed freedom of speech and press, the Okinawans' demands to be allowed to return to their villages, and a general election for the governor and gubernatorial elections. The military government regarded the Okinawans as having no experience of living in a “democracy” and therefore the most appropriate form of government in Okinawa was the “prewar political institutions” with its strict controls from above. This, of course, reflected U. S. military strategy as it sought to use Okinawa as a “primary base” and develop a governing structure that would facilitate “exclusive rule” by U. S. Forces.
The Okinawan political leaders in the Advisory Council reacted cautiously to the military government and attempted to avoid conflicts with its new ruler. In spite of pressure from the Okinawans for the return of their villages and agricultural land, the Council ignored the petition protests from the leaders of local districts. The Advisory Council finally recognized that the “Nimitz Proclamation”

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With the political problems and strategic considerations relating to the United States military presence in Okinawa and East Asia undergoing re-examination at official levels in recent years, a historic look at the formation of U. S. military and political policy toward the region in the early postwar period has become necessary. One curiously unexplored factor in that critical period remains the role of George F. Kennan and the Policy Planning Staff in the examination of policy for Okinawa.
In the middle of the reevaluation of U. S. policy towards occupied Japan during the Fall of 1947 and the Winter/Spring of 1948, particularly in the context of the peace treaty goals of the U. S., Kennan and his staff helped to focus American policy-makers' attention on Okinawa-its vital strategic importance yet curiously undetermined political, military, and international status. Their first study of the issue, “Special Recommendation on the Ultimate Disposition of the Ryukyus, ” also known as PPS/10/1, was inconclusive. As a result Kennan visited Okinawa, a trip surprisingly undiscussed in most scholarship, during his visit to the Far East in March 1948 to meet with General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers. Linking the strategic considerations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with his own ideas of “containment, ” Kennan was able to break the impasse between the State Department and the U. S. military which had existed since 1946. Kennan's opinions formed the basis of National Security Council document NSC 13/3 (“Recommendations With Respect to Japan”), which upon approval by President Harry S. Truman, became the two-staged U. S. position with regard to Okinawa: immediate base development combined with economic rehabilitation of the islands occurring during the first stage and the acquisition of international recognition put off until a future peace treaty.
This paper seeks to trace Kennan's views on Okinawa in this period with particular reference to his visit to Okinawa as well as to examine the influence that Kennan's recommendations had on U. S. policy toward Okinawa. Using extensive archival materials from Washington, Tokyo, and Okinawa, as well as interviews conducted with Kennan, his assistants, and fellow diplomats at the time, this paper aims to fill a void in the history of U. S. -Japan relations, with particular reference to U. S. politico-strategic policy toward Okinawa and Japan.

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The article aims at analyzing the Eisenhower administration's policy toward Okinawa by making two case studies, one on returning administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan, while the United States maintained full rights over military bases in “enclaves”, and the other on currency conversion from B-yen to the U. S. dollar. Both cases raised the fundamental issue touching on the very nature of U. S. administration of the Ryukyu Islands. Many Okinawans criticized the legality of the U. S. administration, and demanded its reversion to Japan. Contrary to the conventional interpretation, currency conversion was the Army Department's effort to indirectly lay the legal basis for an indefinite control of the Islands. It is surprising that President Eisenhower, while strongly supporting the conditional return of the administrative right to Japan to avoid a Cyprus-like situation in Okinawa, and opposing the currency conversion to prevent adverse reaction in Japan and Okinawa, thus undermining U. S. -Japan friendship, could not prevail over his subordinates, particulary the military. The cases exemplify very weak leadership on the part of President Eisenhower in foreign affairs in spite of the well-known claim of Eisenhower revisionism to the contrary. This in turn indicates the strong voice the military had over the administration of the Ryukyu Islands, the keystone of the Pacific. In both cases, Eisenhower was faced with fait accompli set up by the military. The article also takes up bureaucratic interaction between the State Department and the Defense Department over political advisability of accepting Japanese economic and technical assistance to the Islands. President Eisenhower supported the Defense Department, who argued for quite limited assistance lest it might infringe on its exclusive right of control.

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The terms of US-Japan agreement on Okinawa Reversion that have come to light in recent years reveal that Prime Minister Sato ultimately gave the United States much greater latitude on the use of US bases than had previously been thought, including the right of re-entry of nuclear weapons in case of an emergency. But negotiations over Okinawa Reversion also provided the US with the opportunity to change yet another aspect of the US-Japan security relationship. As negotiations proceeded on how to dismantle the military bases and other facilities owned by the US government in Okinawa, a new approach to thinking about Japan's role in the alliance emerged. In fact, the prototype of what later came to be known as Japan's “omoiyari” budget, the financing of US military deployments in Japan, was created during the Okinawa Reversion negotiations.
This article reviews the process by which the US sought to convince the Japanese government to assume the costs of deploying US forces in Japan. The backdrop to these deliberations in the late 1960s was, of course, the US balance-of-payments deficit created as a result of the Vietnam War. Part and parcel of the Nixon Doctrine announced in 1969 was the emphasis on greater allied responsibility for the “burden” of the cold war, and greater allied contributions to the goals of US cold war strategy. The US government argued that Japan's reluctance to increase its own defense spending, along with the growing inability of the US to pay for its overseas basing, made it necessary to find another mechanism for demonstrating Japan's “commitment” to the alliance.
The problem of how to dismantle and consolidate US military assets in Okinawa was complicated, and the process was costly. The terms of the final agreement reached between the US and Japan have been deliberately kept from the Japanese public. US archival documents and Japanese court testimonials for the trial of a Japanese diplomat privy to the terms of this agreement reveal why the Japanese government wished to keep this secret. The deliberations ended with an agreement in 1971 that provided the US government with more than $200 million for its military bases and facilities on Okimawa as well as for bases on the Japanese main islands. Japanese government not only provided the US government with a lump sum payment, over which the US had full discretion, but it also paid for a variety of direct costs associated with the improvement of US military bases in Japan under the terms of the SOFA agreement. In short, the Japanese government not only fully accepted the costly burden of financing US military bases on its territory, but it also provided funds for the US government to use to remedy its balance-of-payments problems.

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The article attempts to treat both the ‘Okinawa problem’, implying its pending territorial status until the Ryukyus reversion, and the ongoing Russo-Japanese dispute over the ‘Northern territories’ as interdependent political issues. Entertaining no doubts about the term ‘residual’ as it was commonly a pplied to the issue of Okinawa's ‘sovereignty’, this article suggests to interpret the ‘Okinawa problem’ as a ‘residual’ territorial dispute. A ‘territorial dispute’ is seen as occurring, according to Paul Huth's definition, when “both governments seek control of and sovereign rights over the same territory”.
Both territorial issues are rooted in the post-World war II rivalry of two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, for the control of geopolitical space. The two issues are unique, however, since they represent territorial disputes, actual and potential, respectively, between both superpowers and a single foreign power, Japan. Moreover, their very existence as the disputes was largely sustained by the continuous rivalry of the superpowers, thus forming a peculiar ‘balance of power’. Hence, in view of a broad range of the research subject and its so far unexplored quality, the primary goal of the article is to pose a scholarly problem rather than draw any immediate conclusions.
Emphasizing their differences from the legal standpoint, the two territorial issues were dealt with in separate Articles, namely 2 (c) and 3, of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. However, according to the treaty's principal author, John Foster Dulles, Article 26 provided for the possibility of the United States' gaining “full sovereignty over the Ryukyus”, in case “Japan recognized that the Soviet Union was entitled to full sovereignty over the Kuriles”.
It is this particular interpretation, personally given by Dulles to Japan's Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru in August 1956, which makes it possible to regard the ‘Okinawa issue’ as a residual territorial dispute. Conveyed inn the course of the Soviet-Japanese normalization talks, this statement served to intensify the interdependence of both territorial issues and to confirm the US position of a concerned ‘third power’. The subsequent application of the ‘Okinawa-Kuriles’ linkage by both the Japanese and the Soviet negotiators, namely Mono Ichiro and Nikita Khruschev, in October 1956 testify to the political uses of international law on their part.
The article's concluding section draws critical attention to post-Cold war efforts to employ the ‘Okinawa reversion’ model for the purpose of resolving the Russo-Japanese territorial dispute in a way presumably identical to the Cold war approach. The Appendix contains a unique document which was found in the US National Archives. Dated August 8, 1967, it is a ‘secret memorandum’ written by Legal Advisor Mark Feldman to Richard Sneider, the US Department of State country director for Japan. This document, in particular, addressed the issue of possible Ryukyus reversion “by executive agreement without formal congressional action”. As such, it is presumed to be directly applicable in terms of modeling the ‘Kuriles issue’ resolution on the ‘Okinawa reversion’ in the context of foreign policy prerogatives of the President and the Diet in post-Soviet Russia.

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Japan's postwar security policy has developed as a derivative of US global strategy, and has served to complement that strategy. Okinawa has served as the military foundation of that policy. The San Francisco Preace Treaty was influenced by events on the Korean peninsula. Moreover, in April 1952, the US-Japan alliance was concluded, and the US military viewed Okinawa as the “cornerstone” of its Pacific strategy. Not only did Okinawa occupy a geographical vantage point for the US to oversee East Asia, but it also provided the means for linking the US with its military allies in the region.
The anti-base movement in Okinawa began to advocate a “return to Japan and its peace constitution” before the San Fracisco Peace Treaty was concluded. After the Treaty was ratified in April 1952, US military authorities in Okinawa clearly viewed the anti-base movement as a tool of international communism, and sought to repress it. But the “shimagurumi toso” (the island-wide protest) against US policy towards expropriated land in Okinawa in the 1950s reinvigorated the anti-base movement, and led to the formation in 1960 of the Council on the Reversion of Okinawa Prefecture to Japan. The anti-base movement in Okinawa intensified with US militaly intervention in Vietnam in 1965, and Okinawan activists joined others around the globe in protest of US strategy. Faced not only with domestic protest but also with a global anti-Vietnam war movement, the US found it increasingly difficult to execise powar over Okinawa.
The reversion of Okinawa negotiated by the US and Japanese governments, however, was seen as a means of reorganizing and strengthening the US-Japan military alliance. The Japanese government used the 1972 reversion of Okinawa to consolidate US military bases. During the 1970s' US military bases on the main Japanese islands were reduced by one-third, but the US bases on Okinawa went virtually untouched. Today, the concentration of 75% of US military forces stationed in Japan on Okinawa, which has only 0.06% of Japan's total land area, is the result of an international policy of transferring the burden of these bases to Okinawa.
Again, in the 1990s' the anti-base movement in Okinawa that emerged after the rape issue in the fall of 1995, was a direct challenge to US and Japanese government efforts to redefine the US-Japan alliance. By redefining the alliance, the US aimed to ensure Japan's support, as a subordinate military partner, in a strategy of joint global hegemony. Japan's military cooperation and rear-area support for US military actions in the vicinity of Japan, and the strengthening and consolidation of US bases on Okinawa, was required.
The 1990s anti-base movement in Okinawa has provided the opportunity for greater cooperation between the Okinawa and Korean anti-base movements. New avenues of cooperation are possible. The peaceful unification of North and South Korea would be extremely advantageous for the reduction and withdrawal of US military bases in Okinawa and Korea. But, the call for the reduction and withdrawal of US military bases has yet to resound broadly among the public, and any real path towards peaceful coexistence on the Korean peninsula, and peace among the countries of Asia, will depend upon broad popular support.

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Today in the Post Cold War Era, the explanations of U. S. government and officials regarding the roles and missions of U. S. military bases and Marine Corps stationed in Okinawa are very confused. Even some highranking Marine Corps officials have raised the possibility of moving the Okinawa Marine Corps to Australia.
The aim of this paper is to explore the future possibility to change the strategic status of the U. S. military bases in Okinawa through analyzing a history of the roles and missions of those military bases and Marine Corps stationed there.
In the Cold War Era, U. S. Military Strategy gave to the U. S. forward deployment forces in the Asia-Pacific region three overall roles and missions: (1) to prevent the Soviet Pacific fleet Moving out to the Pacific Ocean in the all out war between U. S. and Soviet, (2) to prevent and deter possible intervention of Soviet or China to the Asian regional conflicts, (3) to provide forward bases for U. S. intervention in the case of an Asian regional conflict. Regarding (1), U. S. Defense Ministry's report issued on April 1989 described, for the first time, that the roles and missions of Okinawa Marine Corps are controlling the three straits —Tsushima, Tsugaru, Sohya— through which the Soviet Pacific Fleet must move out the Pacific Ocean and capturing the Kuril Islands include Chishima which is into necessary to attack Soviet's military facilities or sea lines of communication.
Now the Cold War is over, U. S. Military Strategy has changed from a strategy of containing the Soviet Union to a Strategy of Regional Defense for defending U. S. national interests. At the same time, U. S. is beginning to regard the emerging China as the biggest rival or the world's largest non-status quo power. In that context, U. S. is paying attention to the connecting line from Korea peninsula, Kyushu, Okinawa, Taiwan, Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore to Indonesia, as a strategically important line which could control the Chinese Fleet to go out the Pacific Ocean. This could be the main reason that U. S. Secretary Defense William S. Cohen emphasized, ‘even after succeeding in peaceful reunification of the Korea Peninsula, our force structure in the East Asia will not change.’
In the Cold War Era, Japan has accepted the permanent stationing of U. S. forces in Japan especially in Okinawa as a international public assets which is necessary to defend the free world from international Communist revolution activities. But the Cold War is over, and the U. S. basic strategy is changing from defending the free world to defending U. S. interests. Okinawa is part of this new trend.

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Two referenda took place in Okinawa prefecture in a short span of time between 1996 and 1997. The raping of a young school girl by American soldiers in September, 1995 had triggered a harsh anti-militaristic protest throughout the Okinawa islands. There is a treaty between the United States and Japan that Japanese authorities can not investigate and try Ameirican soldiers. This treaty has caused several criminal American soldiers to flee to their homeland. Okinawan people have strong feelings concerning the unfairness of the treaty. Some radicalists said that if it can not be changed to be more appropriate, they hope that all the American soldiers will return to the United States. Basically, the Okinawan attitudes toward militaristic power are negative. This reflects the Okinawan tradition as “a peaceful nation” and their horrible experience during World War II. Okinawa is the only prefecture which experienced ground fighting in Japan. Their strong call for peace and the ideal to have the islands without military is essential for the people in Okinawa. This feeling was echoed by the governing circle of the Okinawa prefectural administration. Masahide Oota, the governor of Okinawa Prefecture, raised the question that it is doubtful whether we need such a huge military force on this tiny island after the end of the cold war. This regional clamour of the anti-militaristic movement in Okinawa has called for referenda concerning international security issues. So far, these “high political” securuty issues are seen not as matters of municipality but only as matters concerning the Ministry of Foregin Affairs or the central government itself. Because Japan has a representavive political system, until these referenda, there has been no direct chance to express the peoples' will in the municipality where it has the greatest impact. On September 8, 1996, the first prefectural referendum in Japan was held in Okinawa. The political turmoil in Okinawa has caused another municipal referendum at the city level in Nago City, Okinawa, on December 21, 1997. In this paper an attempt is made to indicate some possible relations between the impact of international issues on the national political situation and the reactions stemming from distinctive cultures. In my analysis, the sub-cultures which are reflected in social cleavages are the core. In order to review this theme, particular attention must be paid to the contribution made by Stein Rokkan. A series of referenda shows the common features of a gap betwen center and periphery in the recognition of international issues. This gap clearly points out the existence of the cleavages in Japan and these referenda clearly show that the international issues have revitalized centreperiphery cleavages in Japan.

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“The Okinawa problem” has always been treated as a dependent variable of the U. S. -Japan alliance under the Cold War structure. This bilateral alliance being intended to enhance Japan's national security, has caused various problems dne to the concentration of U. S. bases in Okinawa which are accepted as a “security cost.” In the field of security studies, the base problem in Okinawa has been considered exclusively a domestic problem which is confined in the context of domestic politics.
After the end of the Cold War, however, the rape incident by U. S. soldiers in 1995, triggered, a burst of anti-base sentiment of the Okinawa people dramatically. It was the biggest protest held by the local people whose lives had been threatend in the name of “national security.” For the Okinawa people, the existence of the U. S. bases has been security threat to their lives.
This essay is intended to examine, based on the development of security studies after the Cold War, a strained and conflicting relationship of the U. S. -Japan alliance between national security concept and individual/human security concept concerning Okinawa. The first Perspective is to clarify theoretically a strained relationship between national security and individual/human security by examining the debate on “Redefining Security.” The latter Perspective is to discuss “Critical Security Studies” which recently has been developed as a human-centred security studies interms of the correlation between subject and object.
Consequently, from the view point of “Critical Security Studies, ” a theoretical framework in which security issues such as the Okinawa problem are disscussed will be presented. The central question is how “security as essentially contested concepts” should be grasped in the post-Cold war era.

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The “Okinawa problem” is made from the complex relationship of three levels of analysis: the first one is a diplomatic problem lies between the Japanese and the US Governments; the second is a dispute over public policy between the Japanese Government and the Okinawa prefecture government; and the last one is a conflict about decision making among various actors in the Okinawa community.
It is this complexity that makes the “Okinawa problem” difficult to resolve. To resolve this, serious attention must be paid to its complexity and the historical background from which the problem has emerged. This paper is intended to reveal the complexity and to identify the impediments in resolving the “Okinawa problem” by analyzing its structure from the three different angles mentioned above. By so doing, the paper aims at developing an analytical framework. This is conducted by using the conflict resolution approach.
The paper is divided into 6 parts. The first section serves as an introduction and it states the purpose of the study. The next section deals with the analytical framework of the study, which focuses on actors, issues, and the historical context of the problem at each analytical level. In the first level of analysis, the status-of-forces agreement will be tackled as an overriding issue of the Japan-US governmental relationship. In the second level, the policy dispute over the burden sharing of Japan's security will be explored as a central disagreement between the central government and the Okinawa prefecture government. This will be followed by an examination of the community conflict between supporters and opponents of the US bases in Okinawa. At this level, feasibility of the “Base-free Okinawa” policy will be discussed. In the conclusion, obstacles to resolving the “Okinawa problem” will be recapitulated and possible formulas for removing them will be considered.
As for the Japan-US diplomatic problems, the study urges to stop assuming that the problems is a distributive (zero-sum) feature. The needed approach must be based on the assumption that a mutually satisfactory solution is possible. De-coupling the vested interests of US Forces in Okinawa from other interlocking wider security problems can be a way to move ahead. Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms should be established between the central government and the Okinawa prefecture government. These mechanisms must serve as confidence-building measures and facilitate dialogue among the actors. The members of the Okinawa community have to come up with a consensus on their attitudes toward the post-base development plans. This can be best accomplished by organizing a series of problem-solving workshops among contending actors.

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In August 1935, Colonel Ishihara Kanji was appointed Chief of the Plans and Policy Division of the Army General Staff, and produced his concept of a grand politico-military strategy for Japan. This was the “Hokushin, Nanshin” (First North, then South) concept, and called for first focusing northwards and denying Soviet Russia's ambitions in Manchuria and northern China and excluding the British from east Asia, after which preparations for the expected decisive war in the south with the United States would be carried out. The Navy, however, opposed Ishihara's concept, because it felt Japan should concentrate on preparing for the war with the U. S. It expected to fight over control of the Pacific, and produced its own concept, which was “Hold in the north, and advance in the south.”
The highest authorities of the Army and Navy eventually jointly produced the “Kokusaku Taiko” (National Policy Guidelines), which called for concentrating simultaneously northwards and southwards, thus basically resolving none of the differences between the Army and Navy, and also the Third Revision of the National Defense Policy, which called for a short, decisive war against one opponent at a time in case of war. Since Ishihara could not agree with these plans, he submitted his own concept, mentioned above, as the “Kokubo Kokusaku Taiko” (National Defense and Political Policy), which called for the Army to direct the development of the military industrial capabilities necessary under Ishihara's plan in Armycontrolled Manchuria. This would enable Ishihara to realize his plans through the Army's efforts alone.
In March 1937, however, Ishihara's supporters in the General Staff and Army Ministry were transferred out, and Ishihara himself was transferred after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese Incident in July. As a result, Ishihara's plan faded away without being realized.

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General Artemio Ricarte, “Vibora, ” is said to be one of the most stubborn Filipino heroes in Philippine history. He never swore allegiance to the United States after he was arrested by the American authorities in February 1899 during the Philippine-American War. Most Filipino historians have not paid much attention to his role in Philippine history because some of them are still suspicious of his nationalistic heroism. His collaboration with the Japanese Army during the Japanese occupation in the Philippines still causes doubt as to whether he was nationalistic or not. This paper is trying to discover if his anti-Americanism was still based on his hopes for Philippine independence by examining the time period between 1915 when he made his personal exile to Japan and 1945 when he died in the Philippines.
Having read his correspondences written in Tagalog (one of the Filipino languages) with his friend in the Philippines, Jose P. Santos, the distinguished Filipino historian, and having examined his political statements regarding the issue of Philippine independence from 1915 to 1941, the author finds that the “stubborness” in his nationalism against the United States changed noticeably over time. It is observed that it changed with times of persons to whom he talked and met. For example, in 1917 when the Jones Act (Philippine Independence Act) was approved by the US Congress, he became sympathetic to the political scene in the United States and praised the political elites of the Philippines such as Manuel I. Quezon of Sergio Osmeña. However, he again became anti-American when he talked to Japanese officials or Japanese police authorities in Yokohama where he lived at that time. Indeed, he supported the anti-American movement in Luzon led by Benigno Ramos, the so-called “Sakdal Movement” in the nineteen thirties. But, even though Ricarte and Ramos held the same position for “immediate, absolute, and complete” independence of the Philippines, he was nevertheless ultimately a “Quzonista” in the sense that he was never opposed the way in which the independence movement led by the Filipino elites such as Quezon was waged. That is, even though he was originally opposed to the ten-year probational independence term, the so-called Commonwealth, he finally came to accept the Commonwealth idea, and government, led by Quezon.
During the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, he again became anti-American. He was not satisfied with a principle policy of the Japanese authorities in which most members of the former Philippine Commonwealth government were again put in important positions in the Philippine Executive Commission governed directly by the Japanese Military Administration. This situation awakened his political aspiration of becoming a dictator. With some Filipino collaborators led by Benigno Ramos and Ganap, Ricarte tried to make a coup attempt against the Laurel government in 1943. But he realized that the government was so stable that they could not do anything against its authority.
Unlike Benigno Ramos, Ricarte was not aggressive in the movement for Philippine independence, where Ramos still had political aspirations to become the new leader. To the end of the war, he was still not satisfied with the political situation where many, so-called, “pro-American” cabinet memebers occupied the Laurel government. But Ricarte did not like to cooperate with Ramos in, for example, the Makapili movement in 1944. Instead, Ricarte organized his own army, the “Peace Army”, for the defense of the Philippine government against the United States.

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