抄録
Were they harmonious with each other, treaty revisions by Munemitu Mutsu and the Sino-Japanese War? This article tried to examine this problem.
Shigenobu Okuma (1888-89 in office), one of the minister for foreign affairs in this period, has been thought as a political rival against Okuma's predecessor Kaoru Inoue and the succeeding prime minister Hirobumi Ito. But, when you investigate their own personal histories, the planning process for the Okuma's negotiation, and the character of the negotiating strategy after Okuma retired, it will be apparent that they three politicians —“Kaimei-Ha” or an enlightenment party— had much common points. They thought that treaty revisions, especially the recovery of tariff autonomy, should take first priority, and that an advance to East Asia should be restrained with all their might.
Then, why Okuma failed and the cooperation of them three ceased? The reason was that there were some middle-management bureaucrats who were hostile to the common thought of the three politicians. They were active behind the scenes, agitated “the public opinions”, and tried to tear Kaimei-Ha into pieces to prevent the treaty revisions. The typical example was Kowashi Inoue. And as a result, Mutsu the minister for foreign affairs, who were forced to begin the negotiations under insufficient condition, was heavily criticized by “Taigai-Ko-Ha” or hard-liners for foreign affairs. And finally he decided to enter the war. Kaimei-Ha was in power almost throughout in this period because they have the clearest foresight, but small number of them made themselves powerless against internal betrayal or terrorism. So they could not yield sufficient success.
