Abstract
It is claimed in bioethics that we should define the concept of person by
certain capacities in order to solve various issues. This claim presupposes
that we can know whether a being has a state of mind only by recognizing a
certain physiological fact of its brain or nerves. Therefore,it can be justified
to stop medical treatment for severely disabled children such as anencephalic
children or children with persistent vegetative state. Wittgenstein would say,
however, that this claim does not reflect our ordinary usage of psychological
concepts. According to him,the“Inner”is expressed in language games even
without any mental events. If that is right,it is not necessary for us to justify
ourselves in regarding these children’s behaviors as expressions of their
“Inner”and in communicating with them.
First, by focusing on the ordinary usage of psychological concepts, we
insist that the “Inner”is constituted of its expressions. Then, by examining
the“Private Language”argument,we demonstrate that the expressed “Inner”
is conceptually connected with certain observable behavior. This does not
lead to behaviorism. Psychological concepts grammatically position the
“Inner”of another person within her/him. This grammatical position forces
us to see her/his expressed “Inner”as hers/his. This means that our attitudes
toward another person are based not on knowledge,but on acknowledgment.
The usage of psychological concepts supports our communication with
severely disabled children. The logical status of the “Inner”requires of us
acknowledgment, or an ethical attitude.