ハーバーマスの討議倫理学における道徳的観点の検討

抄録

This paper explores the possibility of reconstructing a theory of moral education in a pluralistic society, on the basis of the discourse ethics of Jürgen Habermas. Toward this end the author examines the “moral point of view” in discourse ethics in order to grasp clearly the idea of morality as the rational procedure of conflict adjudication.
Discourse ethics represents an attempt to elucidate the rational basis of consensus formation on moral problems through practical discourse. From the universalistic structure of moralpractical discourse, Habermas sheds new light on the abstractive and co-operative features of the point of view of morality.
However, his attempt has given rise to much debate in moral theory. This paper deals with the following issues; first, the conflict between ethics of justice and ethics of care, then, second, the differentiation of justice from good life, and lastly, the elimination of the fruitfulness of plurality by the consensus-focused discourse.
By identifying the moral point of view with impersonal perspectives that regulate fair social co-operation in the public sphere, Habermas strives on the one hand, to retrieve the critical power of morality against reality, and, on the other hand, to reconcile the fragility of the human beings as individuated, through socialization.
This dual function of morality indicates that moral education has to face two tasks at once. Namely, moral education has to provide children with the moral basis in multicultural society by both developing a moral point of view as a transcendental perspective and by nurturing practical reason, or phronesis, which will pave the way for reconstructing the life-world permeated with justice and solidarity.