Seismology and Value Judgment Argument —Old and New Problem Posed in the L’Aquila Trial

抄録

It has been long debated in philosophy of science whether value judgments in scientific process should be (or can be appropriately) made by scientists ever since controversy between Richard Rudner and Richard Jeffery in 1950s. Although the debates have been conducted over some important theoretical respects, most of them have focused on science as it should be in general, and left behind (at least put not so much emphasis on) the actually controversial cases in each science, deviating from real issues. In this short essay, I examine how Rudner’s original statement about value judgments, which is now regarded as a little too demanding for scientists, could revive as a hot issue in a recent case of seismology, L’Aquila earthquake trial, and show what is needed now in the boundary face between science and society as well as in the value judgment argument in philosophy of science.