中国農村のインフォーマルな社会制度に埋め込まれた経済取引

抄録

　The transactions of rural China are self-enforceable without any perfect judiciary third party, because they are embedded in the informal social institution that is characterized as socially networked nepotism based on gift giving. A bilateral transaction such as labor exchange in a village is supported by the villagers' expressive network based on reciprocal gift exchange (li-shang-wang-lai). On the other hand, if villagers try to acquire resources in town, they utilize the instrumental network between village and town based on one-way gift giving toward the town (song-li). In any case transactions are self-enforceable, which is supported with the flow of gifts. The different manners of gift giving, that is reciprocal and one-way, result in the fact that the expressive network is not related to income level but the instrumental one is connected with income.
　First, we prove theoretically that the reciprocal and one-way manners result from rational conduct that minimizes the gift payment. After that, the following hypotheses led by theoretical analysis are empirically tested, that is, (1) A transaction is actually embedded in the expressive and instrumental network, (2) The reciprocal and one-way gift giving are inevitably executed, (3) The boundary between town and village actually exists, (4) The expressive network is not related to income level, (5) The instrumental network is connected with income. The first point is ascertained by the categorical regression analysis of questionnaires about socially networked nepotism in Beijing City. Analyzing household-level micro data for Hubei, Shandong, and Liaoning Provinces significantly proves the other four hypotheses.
　Of course, a society based on the formal judiciary institution is ideal. If the cost of transition from informal to formal institution is prohibitive, however, the present informal network based on gift giving is still adopted by farmers, because it is an intrinsically rational system.