Abstract
Though sociology has revealed the existences of various social power, their undersirability also has to be examined. We take up the subject's and master's preference structure which Miyadai [1989] found, and judge the undesirability from the point of “fairness”. Firstly, we apply the social choice theory on the informational base of just their ordinal preferences. We are involved in “Liberal Paradox” but can reach the conclusion that no undesirable power exists, by the help of Blau [1975] and Harel & Nitzan [1987], which contribute to preserve the principle of fairness. Secondly, if we use the more information of cardinal utilities, the postulate of “earnest desire” can discern between undesirable and not undesirable power. Thirdly, how can such undesirable power be avoided in the situatiion of game? If the subject is allowed to give a compensation to the master, the social condition can still be realizaed which the subject earnestly desire, though it is required to satisfy the condition of how much both estimate the compensation. After all, we can say that the case of undesirable power is restricted.
