Abstract
The importance of modeling the social dilemma under the heterogeneity of actors has been recognized till the present. In this paper, first of all, as a general case, the condition of the pure strategic Nash equilibrium will be made clear when this model is considered as a two selection N-person game. Secondly, as a concrete example, the social phenomenon of neglected bicycles' will be put into model and then the equilibrium will be sought. In this example, the situation will be put into model as a N-person game which each player has different payoff functions, considering the distance from the actor's residence to the station. In this case, the following will be indicated: 1) The situation when some actors will select ‘co-operation’ and when others will select ‘noncooperation’ will bring equilibrium. 2) The payoff function of the most ‘co-operative’ actor is the definite thing to the equilibrium. 3) The eqilibrium does not exist in a model when the average taken out of the heterogeneity among the actors is the same as the payoff function. 4) The equilibrium is pareto-wise superior to any states that have fewer co-operative actors.
