Sociological Theory and Methods
Online ISSN : 1881-6495
Print ISSN : 0913-1442
ISSN-L : 0913-1442
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Volume 13, Issue 2
Displaying 1-9 of 9 articles from this issue
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Special Section
  • Special Section
    Yoshimichi SATO
    1999 Volume 13 Issue 2 Pages 135-136
    Published: January 31, 1999
    Released on J-STAGE: September 30, 2016
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11218/ojjams.13.135
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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  • Power in Mixed Exchange Networks
    Kazuo YAMAGUCHI
    1999 Volume 13 Issue 2 Pages 137-153
    Published: January 31, 1999
    Released on J-STAGE: September 30, 2016
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11218/ojjams.13.137
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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         Using a mathematical behavioral model and the formal logic of rational choice, this paper clarifies some major principles regarding the distribution of power in mixed exchange networks. Mixed exchange networks are exchange networks that have elements of both substitutability and complementarity among multiple exchange relations of an actor. A set of fifteen distinct dating networks is used as illustrative examples to clarify those principles.
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  • Trust and Communication
    Yoshimichi SATO
    1999 Volume 13 Issue 2 Pages 155-168
    Published: January 31, 1999
    Released on J-STAGE: September 30, 2016
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11218/ojjams.13.155
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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         The rational approach and the emotional approach coexist in the study of trust. They are too diversified to synthesize, so we start with one approach-Coleman's expected utility model of trust-and relate it to the other approach. There are two problems about his model, however. First, it does not answer why the trustor cannot expect the trustee's response for sure, Second, he does not build a formal model to support his statement that communication among trustors makes the trustee more trustworthy. We build game theoretic models to solve the above problems. We assume in the first model that there are two types of the trustee-honest and greedy-and that the trustor does not know which type is realized. The equilibria of this game reproduce the results of Coleman's formulation. Then, we build the second model with N trustors and one trustee to explain the effect of communication on trust. We add an assumption that there are communication channels among trustors through which information about past interactions between the trustors and the trustee flows. One equilibrium of this game shows that even the greedy trustee chooses to be trustworthy･ This can be interpreted as the effect of communication on trust relations.
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  • Power and Altruism :
    An evolutionary game theoretic analysis of acts producing power structure
    Naoki SUDO
    1999 Volume 13 Issue 2 Pages 169-182
    Published: January 31, 1999
    Released on J-STAGE: September 30, 2016
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11218/ojjams.13.169
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         In this paper, I clarify a process that produces power structure, under which some people choose a cooperative act by altruistic motive and other people choose an uncooperative act by selfish motive. By using evolutionary game models, I prove the following propositions: 1) When it is assumed that players can choose their payoff functions under the condition that the probability of continuation of the game is low, altruistic players who choose a cooperative act appear at a certain proportion, and the state is stable; 2) In that case, selfish players exploit altruistic players. Therefore, it is concluded that interactions with no constraints are able to produce power structure, and that selfish players exploit altruistic players in such power structure.
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  • On Recursive Definition of Action and Structure
    Yuki YASUDA, Hiroshi TOKURAKU
    1999 Volume 13 Issue 2 Pages 183-192
    Published: January 31, 1999
    Released on J-STAGE: September 30, 2016
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11218/ojjams.13.183
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         Bonachich's definition of centrality is often criticized because of its recursive difinition. We argue the definition has its own rationale, in spite of its demerits. Defining a structure as relatively stable pattern of relations, we can derive a network out of the structure. A network is composed of action, not actors. An effort of defining emergent properties of elements within a network necessarily requires specification of structural properties of other elements within the structure.
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Articles
  • The Condition of Undesirable Power :
    The Normative Study of Expectation Theory of Social Power
    Michiya KAWAMURA
    1999 Volume 13 Issue 2 Pages 193-207
    Published: January 31, 1999
    Released on J-STAGE: September 30, 2016
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11218/ojjams.13.193
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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         Though sociology has revealed the existences of various social power, their undersirability also has to be examined. We take up the subject's and master's preference structure which Miyadai [1989] found, and judge the undesirability from the point of “fairness”. Firstly, we apply the social choice theory on the informational base of just their ordinal preferences. We are involved in “Liberal Paradox” but can reach the conclusion that no undesirable power exists, by the help of Blau [1975] and Harel & Nitzan [1987], which contribute to preserve the principle of fairness. Secondly, if we use the more information of cardinal utilities, the postulate of “earnest desire” can discern between undesirable and not undesirable power. Thirdly, how can such undesirable power be avoided in the situatiion of game? If the subject is allowed to give a compensation to the master, the social condition can still be realizaed which the subject earnestly desire, though it is required to satisfy the condition of how much both estimate the compensation. After all, we can say that the case of undesirable power is restricted.
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  • Social Dilemma Models under the Heterogeneity of Actors
    Hideki KAMIYAMA
    1998 Volume 13 Issue 2 Pages 209-224
    Published: January 31, 1998
    Released on J-STAGE: September 30, 2016
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11218/ojjams.13.209
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         The importance of modeling the social dilemma under the heterogeneity of actors has been recognized till the present. In this paper, first of all, as a general case, the condition of the pure strategic Nash equilibrium will be made clear when this model is considered as a two selection N-person game. Secondly, as a concrete example, the social phenomenon of neglected bicycles' will be put into model and then the equilibrium will be sought. In this example, the situation will be put into model as a N-person game which each player has different payoff functions, considering the distance from the actor's residence to the station. In this case, the following will be indicated: 1) The situation when some actors will select ‘co-operation’ and when others will select ‘noncooperation’ will bring equilibrium. 2) The payoff function of the most ‘co-operative’ actor is the definite thing to the equilibrium. 3) The eqilibrium does not exist in a model when the average taken out of the heterogeneity among the actors is the same as the payoff function. 4) The equilibrium is pareto-wise superior to any states that have fewer co-operative actors.
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  • Signaling theory and hierarchy system :
    Evolution of signaling system which can evade struggle
    Hirokuni OOURA, Takuya KURA
    1998 Volume 13 Issue 2 Pages 225-240
    Published: January 31, 1999
    Released on J-STAGE: September 30, 2016
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11218/ojjams.13.225
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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         Now a lot of Primates live in society with hierarchy system. We studied how such system evolved in the view of ‘honest’ communication.
         The essence of hierarchy system is to evade struggles in groups in order to secure the profit of group formation. And a theory of asymmetrical war of attrition shows that if the strength of the individuals in a struggle and the value of the resource in dispute can be informed correctly the actual struggle is evaded, because the strategy giving up the resource immediately in the contest which does not pay is ESS. So the problem of hierarchy system returns to the problem of information.
         In this study we examined the possibility that such information can be communicated by honest signal. As a result of this analysis it is revealed that i) the signal which informs the strength of the individual can evolve when the marginal cost of signal transmission is smaller for strong individual than for weak one, ii) signal which informs the value of the resource can evolve when ‘vulnerability handicap’ is supposed. These results show that hierarchy system can be explained by the combination of signaling theory and ESS of asymmetrical war of attrition.
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