2006 年 41 巻 p. 41-60
The purpose of this study is to examine the validity of Prof. Inoue's view which stresses the role of the byzantine aristocrat's olkos (household organization which includes the estates and the retainers) as a driving force of the rebellion of lsaakios Komnenos. I have a number of doubts about Prof. Inoue's view. First, is it possible to argue that the regular army was opposed to the aristocrat's private soldiers? Secondly, had the aristocrats' groups of private soldiers the same close connection to the management of aristocrat oikos? If anything, they seem to have been connected to aristocrats' position as high-ranking military officials. It seems more likely that they formed a small guard corps around the aristocrats' role as high-ranking military officers rather than being formed through their connections with the aristocrats' estate management. If this is the case, then thirdly, it is doubtful whether they had the military strength to determine the success of the rebellion as a separate entity from the state armies. Finally, as a fourth problem, we need to examine if, as Prof. Inoue says, the sheer number of private soldiers was main cause determining the importance of revel leaders, and whether such a condition became the basis of Skylitzes' selection when he named the rebel families.
Our final conclusion is that the number of aristocrats' private soldiers was not the decisive factor in selecting the leaders of the revolting armies. The rebellion of lsaakios Komnenos was the one of generals who could mobilize military forces stationed in Asia Minor. The precedence of leaders in the rebellion greatly depended on their careers in the state apparatus, such as their honorary titles and past military exploits. On the other hand, we could not determine any evidence that the scale of their household was considered.
