1995 年 1995 巻 26 号 p. 45-57
A theoretical challenge presented by the rational choice paradigm against the bureaucracy dominant model, which has been the orthodox understanding of Japanese politics, seems to be quite successful in gaining new converts. This new approach explains the dominance of politicians in Japanese politics from the institutional features such as the SNTV (single non-transferable vote) electoral system and parliamentalism rather than Japan's unique culture. However, the rational choice approach at present cannot provide any convincing explanation regarding Japan's unique economic performance, which is a major area of concern in the field of comparative political economy. This is because the rational choice approach has overemphasized the similarity of the political economic system of Japan to those of other industrial democracies.
The review article examines the puzzle of Japanenese economic performance using the rational choice approach. It contends that the rational choice approach is as good at figuring out the differences among industrial democracies as at explaining similarities, if the question is posed properly. The auther claims that the rational choice institutionalism is also promising in the field of comparative political economy.