公共選択の研究
Online ISSN : 1884-6483
Print ISSN : 0286-9624
ISSN-L : 0286-9624
一票の平等について
経済学的視点から
和田 淳一郎
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ジャーナル フリー

1995 年 1995 巻 26 号 p. 58-67

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With the recent election reform, the Japanese Diet did not correct the unequal apportionment enough. The Lower House slipped in a rule that is advantageous for less populated prefectures. They provided one seat for each prefecture at first and after that the rest of the seats are assigned by the rule of the method of largest remainders. Because of this rule, if we add the single-member district parts to proportional representation parts, the Minami-Kanto proportional representation area (Chiba, Kanagawa and Yamanashi) has fewer representatives than the Tokai area (Gifu, Shizuoka, Aichi and Mie), although the population is higher. This essay, indicates that such an unequal apportionment makes even the welfare of the people who have more representatives worse than that under an ideal apportionment.

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