開放経済におけるコンフリクト,国際競争,経済成長

抄録

In this paper, we propose a Kaleckian model in which international competition and conflict dynamics determine national growth rate. Some Kaleckian models have introduced international trade and conflict inflation, for example, Cassetti[2002], Missaglia[2007]. In these models, while national goods face international competition, price pressure has no impact on conflict dynamics, or influences only firms' mark-up. There are few Kaleckian models that focus on international competition effects on workers' wage bargaining. But in real world, workers can't claim high wage without considering international price competition. If workers raise wage level sharply under keen competition, national products may be not able to sustain its price competitiveness, and decrease its share of world market. Because own country's products' relative high price may contract domestic labor demand, workers need compromise to some extent in wage bargaining for keeping price competitiveness. Similarly, firms can't set too high rate of mark-up, to avoid defeat in international competition. So we present the conflict model that both of firms and workers have each target profit share, and adjust it considering real exchange rate. On this assumption, effect of increase in international competition pressure on national income distribution is ambiguous. It depends on institutional conflict parameter. We can classify societies into two groups from the view point of distribution regime. If profit share rises (wage share falls) when real exchange rate falls, this can be called a society that 'workers are sensitive', because workers are more influenced to increase in international price pressure than firms. Conversely, if profit share falls with real exchange rate, this is a society that 'firms are sensitive'. We also show two growth regimes following traditional Kaleckian literatures. One is 'wage-led growth' that high wage share leads high accumulation rate, and the other is 'profit-led growth' that is converse. Using this model, we investigate relation between international competition and national economic growth. Whether increase in price pressure of foreign goods leads lower growth rate, depends on the combination of distribution regimes and growth regimes. In societies that growth regime is profit-led (or weak wage-led) and firms are sensitive, when price inflation rate of foreign goods falls, own country's accumulation rate declines. In the same way, societies that growth regime is wage-led (or weak profit-led) and workers are sensitive, also follow low growth scenario under hard international competition. But on the other hand, in societies that growth regime is strong wage-led and firms are sensitive, or that growth regime is strong profit-led and workers are sensitive, increase in international price pressure conversely make own country's accumulation rate higher. The central claim of this paper is that, for discussing about national growth scenario in international economy, we need consider not only growth regime but also distribution regime.