共同行為の構成条件

抄録

Discussions of “joint action” or “collective action” that have developed out of English-language works on action theory might be said to have arisen from the intuition that action alone and action in a group are distinctly different things. But is it really necessary to conceptually distinguish joint action from the action performed by individuals? If it is necessary, how should we characterize joint action? This paper seeks an answer to these fundamental questions.
In Section 1, I first argue that it is possible to define joint action as distinct from individual action. I then propose a definition of joint action in terms of the interdependency of action by multiple agents. In Section 2, noting that most existing theories of joint action describe it as an entanglement of each individual' s propositional attitude (intention, belief, etc.), I argue that we need to understand joint action not at the level of propositional attitude but, rather, at the level of action. In Section 3, I critically consider the idea that it is necessary to specifically characterize a group as an agent distinct from the individuals performing a joint action. Finally, in Section 4 I show that the scope of an action, as well as the scope of agents of joint actions, can be determined not a priori but only within the context of the particular event, and that the concept of joint action should be examined in association with ethical concepts such as “negligence”, “fault”, and “responsibility”.