ドゥンス・スコトゥスの形相的区別について

意味論的観点から

抄録

Almost all interpreters agree that the formal distinction (distinctio formalis) of Duns Scotus is located between formalities/entities/realities. This concept is characterized as a “mediate distinction” between the real distinction (distinctio realis), which exists without intellect, and the distinction of reason (distinctio rationis), which is produced only by the activity of the intellect. According to Scotus, the formal distinction has both a real basis and a relationship to intellect. These characterizations do not provide a complete exposition of formal distinction; rather, they raise questions about the nature of formality: what is its ontological status, and how formal distinction relates to intellect. Major interpreters, such as Maurice Grajewski, Allan Wolter, and Michel Jordan, have not provided clear answers to these questions.

The main purpose of the present article is to respond to these questions by describing the system of formal distinction in the thought of Scotus. First, we consider Scotus’s motivation to introduce this distinction by analyzing his answer to the question “Whether this proposition ‘man is animal’ is true?” His aim in this question of his Quaestiones in librum Porphyrii Isagoge, if we adopt the language of current analytical philosophy, is to put forward a truthmaker theory. And this interpretation is further elucidated in his (probably) late work, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis.

Second, depending on this understanding, we describe formal distinction using the mathematical idea of homomorphism. In Scotus’s thinking, the homomorphic map φ, which preserves the structure of propositions, can be possibly defined as follows: φ: C → M (where C is the logical or intentional domain and M is the metaphysical or existential one). We call this map φ the analytical map. This mathematical model suggests a distinct formulation of formal distinction. Let c, c₁, and c₂ be concepts, R₁ and R₂ be relations between concepts, f, f₁, and f₂ be formalities, and R₁′ and R₂′ be relations between formalities. There then exists an analytical mapping such that φ(cR₁c₁) = fR₁ ′f₁ and φ(cR₂c₂)= fR₂′ f₂; the distinction, then, between f₁ and f₂ is a formal distinction. This interpretation provides a foundation for Wolter’s idea that formality is an objective basis for a concept produced by intellect.