The Correctness of Names in Plato's Cratylus

Abstract

In Plato's Cratylus, Socrates investigates the 'correctness of names' and takes exception to both Hermogenes' conventionalism and Cratylus' naturalism, for they both neglect the possibility of the false use of names. By refuting the arguments of Hermogenes and Cratylus, Socrates suggests a new theory that will embrace the possibility of the false use of names. To construct such a theory, however, a new element other than the name-object relation must be taken into account-that is, our knowledge of'what an object is'. If we do not have adequate understanding of an object, we cannot use the name correctly. The main aim of Cratylus, therefore, is to suggest the importance of the Socratic elenchus as a means to lead us to such an understanding.