相対主義と寛容のプロブレマティーク

「収斂」の新たなイメージに向けて

抄録

There are two main types of justification of moral relativism : theoretical and practical. The former is not inherently problematical. But the latter, which asserts that moral relativism is desirable because it leads a desirable end, i.e., tolerance, contains a paradox. Because in saying so, moral relativism, namely the morality of liberal tolerance, comes to regard itself as a non-relative (absolute) morality. In this thesis, we elucidate the paradoxical problematique of relativism and tolerance by referring to the argument of Bernard Williams. And after that, we try to find a way out of the vicious circle of tolerance and intolerance. In this search, it is Richard Rorty that gives us an important suggestion. Our basic strategy is not only the critique of relativism but also the one of a tacit premise shared by both sides of relativism and absolutism (or universalism). This common presupposition is the way of regarding different societies as incommensurable axiomatic systems. Our trial will give an alternative image of “convergence” among many different moral communities.