道徳的実在論と規則遵守問題

水本 正晴

doi:10.11439/philosophy1952.2006.210

道徳的実在論と規則遵守問題

水本正晴

著者情報

ジャーナルフリー

2006 年 2006 巻 57 号 p. 210-226,12

DOI https://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2006.210

詳細

発行日: 2006/04/01 受付日: - J-STAGE公開日: 2009/07/23 受理日: - 早期公開日: - 改訂日: -
訂正情報
訂正日: 2009/07/23 訂正理由: - 訂正箇所: 論文抄録訂正内容: Wrong : Moral Realism and Rule-Following Considerations
Masaharu MIZUMOTO
In this paper I defend moral realism by considering Wittgenstein's remarks on rule-following in his Philosophical Investigations. Due to the lack of any positive theory in Wittgenstein's text, this argument is supplemented by my reconstruction of Wittgenstein's theory of aspect in Part II of Investigations. In trying to answer the "paradox" of rule-following made famous by Kripke, I will show that, in the spirit of direct realism, an aspect of normativity, if it the has proper surroundings (Umgebung), is a fact of normativity, which rules that the subject ought to do such and such.
This basic thesis is coupled with the (Sellars-McDowell's) idea of the space of reasons, which is also joined with the idea of fact causation. As a result, we can think that moral facts or facts of normativity do have causal efficacy, as long as they are reasons for action. This theory is, therefore, naturalistic as well as rationalistic, although this "naturalism" is in the sense of second nature a la McDowell. The notion of aspect itself will also be given a naturalistic interpretation analogous to the Gibsonian conception of information.
The paper will proceed more like drawing a (better, alternative) picture, than giving a set of arguments, because of the nature of the topic.
Right : In this paper I defend moral realism by considering Wittgenstein's remarks on rule-following in his Philosophical Investigations. Due to the lack of any positive theory in Wittgenstein's text, this argument is supplemented by my reconstruction of Wittgenstein's theory of aspect in Part II of Investigations. In trying to answer the "paradox" of rule-following made famous by Kripke, I will show that, in the spirit of direct realism, an aspect of normativity, if it the has proper surroundings (Umgebung), is a fact of normativity, which rules that the subject ought to do such and such.
This basic thesis is coupled with the (Sellars-McDowell's) idea of the space of reasons, which is also joined with the idea of fact causation. As a result, we can think that moral facts or facts of normativity do have causal efficacy, as long as they are reasons for action. This theory is, therefore, naturalistic as well as rationalistic, although this "naturalism" is in the sense of second nature a la McDowell. The notion of aspect itself will also be given a naturalistic interpretation analogous to the Gibsonian conception of information.
The paper will proceed more like drawing a (better, alternative) picture, than giving a set of arguments, because of the nature of the topic.

訂正日: 2009/07/23 訂正理由: - 訂正箇所: 引用文献情報訂正内容: 訂正前 : 菅豊彦(二〇〇〇年)「道徳的実在論(1)?功利主義批判?」『九州大学人間科学紀要』Vol.6.
菅豊彦(二〇〇一年)「道徳実在論と主観性」『文学研究』第98号。
Kripke, S. (1982), Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Harvard(邦訳:『ウィトゲンシュタインのパラドックス:規則・私的言語・他人の心』、黒崎宏訳、産業図書、一九八五年。)
McDowell, J. (1981) "Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following", Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule, ed. by S. Holtzman and C. Leich, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London and New York, pp. 141-62. (McDowell 1998 bに再録)
McDowell, J. (1984) "Wittgenstein on Following a Rule", Synthese 58, pp. 325-363. (McDowell 1998 bに再録)
McGinn, C. (1984), Wittgenstein on Meaning:An Introduction and Evaluation, Blackwell.(邦訳:『ウィトゲンシュタインの言語論』植木哲也他訳、勁草書房、一九九〇年。)
水本正晴(一九九九年a)、「「取り囲む」こと?「探究」のUmgebung概念をめぐって?」『哲学の探求』第26号[この出版されたヴァージョンにはオリジナルの原稿にあった脚注がすべて抜け落ちている。完全な論文を希望される方は、著者まで]。
水本正晴(一九九九年b)、「マクダウェルの「内在的実在論」」『科学哲学』32-2.
水本正晴(二〇〇一年)、「事実と民間心理学もう一つの目然化へ向けて」『科学基礎論研究』第95号。
水本正晴(二〇〇二年a)、「ウィトゲンシュタイン」の章、川端・栗林他著『西洋の哲学者たち』梓出版。
水本正晴(二〇〇二年b)、「意図、身体、視覚-ウィトゲンシュタインの実験」『科学哲学』35-1.
水本正晴(二〇〇二年c)、「事実と因果?チャンスと因果の実在性」『科学基礎論研究』第97号。
Wittgenstein, L. (1958), Philosophical Investigations (PI), Basil Black-well.(邦訳:『哲学探究』藤本隆志訳、大修館書店、一九七七年。)
Wittgenstein, L. (1994), The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Basil Black-well.(邦訳:「青色本・茶色本」、『ウィトゲンシュタイン全集6』所収、大修館書店、一九八七年。)
Wittgenstein, L. (1969), Uber Gewissheit (OC), Harper Torchbooks.(邦訳:「確実性の問題」、『ウィトゲンシュタイン全集9』所収、大修館書店、一九八八年。)

訂正後 : 菅豊彦(二〇〇〇年)「道徳的実在論(1)?功利主義批判?」『九州大学人間科学紀要』Vol.6.
菅豊彦(二〇〇一年)「道徳実在論と主観性」『文学研究』第98号。
Kripke, S. (1982), Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Harvard(邦訳:『ウィトゲンシュタインのパラドックス:規則・私的言語・他人の心』、黒崎宏訳、産業図書、一九八五年。)
McDowell, J. (1981) "Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following", Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule, ed. by S. Holtzman and C. Leich, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London and New York, pp. 141-62. (McDowell 1998 bに再録)
McDowell, J. (1984) "Wittgenstein on Following a Rule", Synthese 58, pp. 325-363. (McDowell 1998 bに再録)
McGinn, C. (1984), Wittgenstein on Meaning:An Introduction and Evaluation, Blackwell.(邦訳:『ウィトゲンシュタインの言語論』植木哲也他訳、勁草書房、一九九〇年。)
水本正晴(一九九九年a)、「「取り囲む」こと?「探究」のUmgebung概念をめぐって?」『哲学の探求』第26号[この出版されたヴァージョンにはオリジナルの原稿にあった脚注がすべて抜け落ちている。完全な論文を希望される方は、著者まで]。
水本正晴(一九九九年b)、「マクダウェルの「内在的実在論」」『科学哲学』32-2.
水本正晴(二〇〇一年)、「事実と民間心理学もう一つの目然化へ向けて」『科学基礎論研究』第95号。
水本正晴(二〇〇二年a)、「ウィトゲンシュタイン」の章、川端・栗林他著『西洋の哲学者たち』梓出版。
水本正晴(二〇〇二年b)、「意図、身体、視覚-ウィトゲンシュタインの実験」『科学哲学』35-1.
水本正晴(二〇〇二年c)、「事実と因果?チャンスと因果の実在性」『科学基礎論研究』第97号。
Wittgenstein, L. (1958), Philosophical Investigations (PI), Basil Black-well.(邦訳:『哲学探究』藤本隆志訳、大修館書店、一九七七年。)
Wittgenstein, L. (1994), The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Basil Black-well.(邦訳:「青色本・茶色本」、『ウィトゲンシュタイン全集6』所収、大修館書店、一九八七年。)
Wittgenstein, L. (1969), Uber Gewissheit (OC), Harper Torchbooks.(邦訳:「確実性の問題」、『ウィトゲンシュタイン全集9』所収、大修館書店、一九八八年。)

訂正日: 2009/07/23 訂正理由: - 訂正箇所: PDFファイル訂正内容: -

抄録

In this paper I defend moral realism by considering Wittgenstein's remarks on rule-following in his Philosophical Investigations. Due to the lack of any positive theory in Wittgenstein's text, this argument is supplemented by my reconstruction of Wittgenstein's theory of aspect in Part II of Investigations. In trying to answer the "paradox" of rule-following made famous by Kripke, I will show that, in the spirit of direct realism, an aspect of normativity, if it the has proper surroundings (Umgebung), is a fact of normativity, which rules that the subject ought to do such and such.
This basic thesis is coupled with the (Sellars-McDowell's) idea of the space of reasons, which is also joined with the idea of fact causation. As a result, we can think that moral facts or facts of normativity do have causal efficacy, as long as they are reasons for action. This theory is, therefore, naturalistic as well as rationalistic, although this "naturalism" is in the sense of second nature a la McDowell. The notion of aspect itself will also be given a naturalistic interpretation analogous to the Gibsonian conception of information.
The paper will proceed more like drawing a (better, alternative) picture, than giving a set of arguments, because of the nature of the topic.

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