動物解放論と利益の平等な配慮

抄録

In this article, Peter Singer's animal liberation and criticism agaist it is discussed. Singer's animal liberation is based on the principle of equal consideration of interests. However, the basis for this principle is derived from the logical requirement of universalizability of moral judgment. Thus, on the part of people who deny any consideration of animal interests or who think animal interests weigh less than those of humans, there is a responsibility to prove the validity of their views. Though some think animal interests are not the immediate object of moral consideration, they in fact are. Those who feel that more consideration should be placed on human interests compared to animals, in order to justify this inequality, point out the relevant moral differences between the two such as rationality, autonomy, moral agency, and so on. These people must come face to face with the so called, the problem of "marginal cases" in which it is stated that the interests of people lacking these qualities or capacities need not be considered. Though many solutions have been proposed, not one has been satisfactory. Thus, Singer's view that it is an unjustifiable discrimination not to consider animal interests as strongly just because they are for animals, can be indeed labeled as "speciesism." However, there are views stating that no interests worthy of consideration exist for animals because they do not have any sense of self and not even any consciousness. This problem can not be simply solved by physiology or cognitive ethology. Since it contains philosophical aspects such as "what is consciousness"or"what is belief, " its resolution is not at all easy. Though the principle of equal consideration of interests has sufficient ground, there still is room for debate on whether animals possess any interests to be considered. Therefore, animal liberation calls for discussion as well.