A Viewpoint of the Classic Just War Theory: A Comparison of its Legal Structures to that of Modern Legal Theories for Purpose of Limiting a War

抄録

Through this article, I aim to reevaluate the classic just war theory and defense it against major criticism. The criticism the theory has garnered is due to its unique legal structure, or composition, which is entirely different from that of major modern international theories. One of the tasks I have undertaken is to clarify the differences between the legal structures of the classic just war theory and that of modern international theories. My main task is to highlight the fact that the unique theoretical structure of the classic just war theory can contribute toward limiting and restraining a war, and eventually lead to peace itself. The key concept of the structure is proportionality.

The concept of proportionality has been articulated, as in the Naulilaa case, as a requirement for reprisals. The impact or the scope of the use of force in general, however, has not been fully determined because the inter-war period was referred to as a transitional period for the law prohibiting the use of force. After World War II, reprisals were banned as illegal use of force, and this meant that the requirement of proportionality itself was outdated.

I trace the roots of the concept of proportionality in classic just war theory. The reevaluation of the theory thus leads to a reevaluation of the concept of proportionality. This means that the historical continuity of the concept of proportionality is confirmed by its presence in the classic just war theory; the significance of the concept in military issues is characterized as a consequence of the legal and theoretical structure of the classic just war theory. By following these steps, through this article, I will provide, in some way, a new viewpoint for the regulation of the use of force.