8　出口戦略のディレンマ　構築すべき平和の多義性がもたらす難題

抄録

Why do intervening states have difficulty deciding whether to withdraw from armed peace operations? Previously, it has been argued that intervening states lack the will or ability to plan exit strategies, but this paper argues that even with those traits, they struggle with justifying withdrawal.

When intervention begins, intervening states need internal and international support. From the intervening statesʼ perspective, it is necessary to portray the intervention objective as a “just cause” to obtain as much support as possible. Intervention objectives tend to be ambiguous. For example, if an intervening state announces that its objective is to “prevent hotbeds of terrorism,” almost all states and people will agree with the objective because they can interpret it to suit their own purposes.

However, ambiguous objectives are accompanied by complex criteria with which to evaluate whether those objectives have been achieved. For example, if the objective is to “prevent hotbeds of terrorism,” does this goal require the elimination of all terrorists in the intervened states or does it only mean protecting civilians until the intervened statesʼ security forces are prepared to protect them?

Given this ambiguity, termination factions emphasize the least demanding criteria for achievement of the objective, for example, that protecting civilians has been achieved. In contrast, continuation factions emphasize the most demanding criteria, for example, that the elimination of all terrorists has not been achieved. Owing to these different evaluation criteria, the continuation factions fail to persuade the termination factions and vice versa. Thus, both factions end up talking past each other.

In summary, ambiguous objectives may justify intervention, but the very same objectives may not necessarily justify withdrawal. Every advantage has its disadvantage. Intervening states face a dilemma that I will refer to as the dilemma of exit strategy.