復興期日本の貨物自動車運送事業

抄録

In this article, I examine as a case study Zenkaren, the truck-transportation control association. This paper also discusses issues related to resource allocation mechanisms through control or market forces. After World War Two, many Japanese army trucks were used for the private informal transportation business. In March 1946 the Transport Ministry expanded the national truck-transportation (Shoueijidousha), aiming to check the power of this informal freight and gain control over the truck-transportation sector. However, this policy was against the interests of formal truck-transportation private companies. Zenkaren lobbied against this policy, and consequently the policy was reduced in part. At the same time, GHQ was planning to sell off military trucks and trailers in Japan. The Japanese government planned that Shoueijidousha would manage these trucks and trailers. Zenkaren lobbied against this plan however and it was terminated, Shoueijidousha being restrained by agreement between Zenkaren and the Transport Ministry. From the above, we can conclude that Zenkaren's post-war lobbying reflected different conditions from the World War Two period. This condition change was brought about by allocation issues due to increased numbers of trucks. Next I consider the rationing of fuel, tires and new trucks, examined through examples of companies' actions to obtain those materials. Under the rationing system, fuel was linked with important loads. This coordination was achieved through the control association. But this system only covered part of the fuel allocation system. Many companies obtained fuel from the informal market. The informal market absorbed most of the tires available, and pushing the price every higher. The control association and many companies experienced financial difficulties as a result, and also the number of privately-owned trucks increased. Last, many companies diversified in order to carry more loads. Further research on this diversification would clarify the issue whether companies' actions might not necessarily be profitable within the control system.