第二次世界大戦後の復興と安定の歴史的位相

抄録

Analyses of post-World War II reconstruction and stabilization have focused on advanced countries, but examination of under-developed areas, as well, will provide us with a more comprehensive view of this historical process.

Western European reconstruction and stability were achieved fairly systematically. Following the end of the war, Western European countries ran short of dollars to import the machines and raw materials that were indispensable for industrial reconstruction. Currency stabilization and foreign exchange liberalization were regarded as necessary steps to increasing foreign trade. Western Europe was rescued from the 1947 liquidity crisis by emergency loans from the IMF, World Bank and Washington Export-Import Bank (EXIM). Then, from 1948-52, the Marshall Aid Plan supplied dollars to Western Europe. Once they had achieved currency stability around 1949, Western Europe's countries pursued exchange-rate liberalization based on support from the IMF and European Payments Union (EPR). They finally achieved stability in the mid-1950s.

In under-developed areas, by contrast, development and stabilization were a fluctuating and disorderly process. In comparison to the developed countries that were at the center of the post-war international economic system (IMF=GATT regime), under-developed areas were marginal. The U.S provided them aid sporadically, on an ad hoc basis. Although Truman expressed enthusiasm for development when he presented his “Point Four Program”, the U.S. hesitated to embark decisively on an aids program. 1956, however, proved a turning point and the U.S. began actively to export an American development model to counter the Soviet model. The World Bank took its part by complementing the U.S. aid.

East Asia was a marginal area in the post-war international economic order, but it was at the vanguard of the cold war. Following World War II, “the yen exchange area” was divided into three regions: the communist (China), the under-developed (Korea and Taiwan), and the developed (Japan). In other words, the East Asian economy was characterized by segmentation. Trade among these areas was limited. Although the U.S. offered Korea and Taiwan huge sums of economic and military aid, it had no feasible program for East Asian integration.

By the beginning of the 1960s, the U.S. had elaborated an “Economic Growth Model” common to developed and under-developed countries. This model successfully masked the disparities in the post-war international economic system.