Reports of the City Planning Institute of Japan
Online ISSN : 2436-4460
Green Space Agreement and External Diseconomy
Observation using the Game Theory
Kenichi Shimamoto
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RESEARCH REPORT / TECHNICAL REPORT FREE ACCESS

2016 Volume 15 Issue 2 Pages 133-135

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Abstract

The mechanism of the formation of the green space agreement, an effective tool for the conservation and creation of green space is analysed using the coalition game. The results found that the number of supporters and free riders of the green space agreement is dependent on the size of the external diseconomy caused by the lack of green space, the government's rate of enforceability of taxes on the diseconomy. Furthermore, it was identified that the rate of enforceability is affected by land prices and the decline in land prices due to the external diseconomies from the neglect of green space.

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