Between “Religious” Religious Phenomena and “Secular” Religious Phenomena

What Sort of Elements Could Be the Norm of Religion?

Abstract

In this paper, I will consider the problem regarding what sort of elements can be seen as the norm of “religion,” rather than what the norm of religion really is. Because we have maintained the assumption that the norm of religion is unquestionably something phenomenal, this problem has remained unexamined. However, recent studies reveal that the defining characteristic of religion cannot be something phenomenal, and assert the necessity to avoid the view that the norm of religion is defined by a particular phenomenon. By considering two examples, religious phenomena usually seen as religion (“religious” religious phenomena [e.g., Christianity or Shinto]) and religious phenomena usually seen as secular (“secular” religious phenomena [e.g., Marxism or progressivism]), this paper attempts to find the elements that can be seen as the norm of religion. Finally, I conclude that in order to judge a phenomenon as religion, observers have to discover a particular form of cognition that makes secular things religious. While this paper does not yet address the problem of what the norm of religion is, it establishes the basis for further study.