Why do some philosophers think that emotive meaning is not cognitive ?

A defense of moral sentiment theory

Abstract

According to moral sentiment theory, morals cannot be derived from reason. Therefore, if we accept moral sentiment theory, and yet still contend that moral judgments can be cognitive and rational, we have to carry out two tasks. In the first place, we should show that moral judgments based on passions, sentiments, or on something of that kind, can be, as a matter of fact, cognitive, and so have some kind of rationality. Secondly, as many contemporary philosophers still tend to think that emotive meaning is non-cognitive, and so non-rational, we should explain why and how this unfortunate situation has been brought about.
In this essay, the author tries to answer the second problem, leaving the first for another occasion. The argument will proceed as follows.
The author propounds (1) the process how in the 20th century, many moral philosophers have come to think that moral judgments have no descriptive meaning. And they think that judgments which lack descriptive meaning, cannot be cognitive.
The author also attempts to explain (2) how ‘emotion’, during the course of history in the 19th century, has replaced ‘passion’, ‘affection’, ‘sentiment’, etc. These latter feelings, however, not only in moral sentiment theories in the 18th century but also in Aristotle's and Thomas Aquinas' theory, had been considered to be susceptive to reason, and therefore to have some rationality.
As for (1), the author depicts the development of ethical theory since G.E. Moore's refutation of ethical naturalism to Stevenson's emotivism. And as for (2), the role William James had played will be emphasized.